Local Government Law by Knight, Barry R. & Murray, Murray R.
SMU Law Review
Volume 41





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Barry R. Knight* and Kevin R. Murray**
I. OPEN MEETINGS ACT
C X Enterprises v. Board of Trustees' involved Texas Revised Civil
Statutes Annotated article 6252-17, the Texas Open Meetings Act.2
The Austin American-Statesman contended that the Austin In-
dependent School District Board of Trustees, by posting an agenda that
listed only general terms such as "personnel," "litigation," and "real estate
matters," failed to give adequate notice of its executive sessions. The news-
paper also contended that the board failed to comply with the Act by con-
vening various executive sessions and violating the Act's prohibition against
taking final action on any matter in a closed session. The Texas Supreme
Court provided that, although the court has held that a general notice may
establish substantial compliance with the Open Meetings Act in certain
cases, even though the notice is not as specific as it could be, less than full
disclosure does not establish substantial compliance. 3 In this instance the
court held that the board did not provide full and adequate notice merely by
indicating that the board was going to discuss personnel matters when in
fact they discussed selection of a new school superintendent. 4 Moreover, a
notice about "litigation" was not sufficient notice when the board was dis-
cussing a major desegregation lawsuit.5 The court also held that a quorum
of the governmental body must convene in open session before the board
may go into executive session. 6 Accordingly, a valid board meeting requires
a quorum that is present and physically able to deliberate.7 The Act entitles
the public to know which members are present for the closed session and
whether a quorum is present.8
* B.U.P., B.A., University of Cincinnati; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at Law, Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, Dallas, Texas. Lecturer of Local Gov-
ernment Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
** B.A., Brigham Young University; J.D., Brigham Young University. Attorney at Law,
Jones, Day, Reavis, & Pogue, Dallas, Texas.
1. 706 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. 1986).
2. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon 1985).
3. 706 S.W.2d at 958; see Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 520
S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tex. 1975).






In Smith County v. Thornton 9 the supreme court also held that the Open
Meetings Act requires literal compliance with the notice provision. The
Smith County commissioners court voted to close a portion of Jim Hogg
Road. One week later that court met and authorized the county judge to
transfer that closed portion of Jim Hogg Road to Tyler Pipe Industries. The
court posted notice for meetings to discuss this transfer on a bulletin board
on the first floor of the Smith County Courthouse. The bulletins were posted
on the Friday morning before the meeting on the following Monday. That
courthouse is closed and locked from 8:30 p.m. on Fridays until 6:00 a.m. on
Mondays. The public may enter the courthouse on weekends only through
the sheriff's office located in the courthouse basement. The supreme court
agreed with the court of appeals' statement that section 3A(h) of the Open
Meetings Act requires literal compliance with the Act.' 0 In this case notice
was not posted in a place that was readily accessible to the general public for
at least seventy-two hours preceding the meeting. The court, therefore,
found that the commissioners' actions were void.II
Johnson v. Adams 12 involved the question whether the first amendment
mandated that Texas allow videotaping of regular sessions of the Titus
County commissioners court. According to the court, Johnson did not in-
volve closed meetings in the commissioners court in violation of the Texas
Open Meetings Act. 13 The case also did not involve issues usually present in
this area of first amendment litigation. The plaintiffs were not denied the
right to audiotape the commissioners court proceedings or the right of access
to prisoners in a correctional institution.' 4 Johnson did not involve the right
of access to executive sessions of the commissioners court, or access to classi-
fied documents, public records, or open criminal trials.15 The case also did
not involve prior restraint.' 6 The sole issue in Johnson was whether the first
amendment of the United States Constitution mandated that a state allow
videotaping of the regular sessions of the commissioners court of a rural
Texas county.' 7 As a matter of law, the court found that the first amend-
ment did not.' 8
II. CONTRACT LIABILITY
During the Survey period the Texas Supreme Court decided two contract
cases holding a municipality liable for attorney's fees. In Gates v. City of
Dallas '9 a city employee and his wife sued the city for unpaid health bene-
9. 726 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1986).
10. Id. at 3; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A(h) (Vernon 1985).
11. 726 S.W.2d at 3.
12. 629 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Tex. 1986).






19. 704 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1986).
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fits.20 The court held that when the city of Dallas, as a self-insured home
rule city, entered into an insurance contract with Gates, it acted in its pro-
prietary role, and thus had the same authority and potential liabilities as a
private citizen. 21 As a private citizen, the city of Dallas therefore became
subject to article 2226,22 the Texas statute regulating claims based on written
contracts. 23 The court stated that the legislature intended article 2226 to
apply to municipal corporations engaged in proprietary functions.24 More-
over, the court found that the legislature enacted article 2226 to discourage
precisely the type of litigation Gates had to initiate. 25
The supreme court once again found a city liable for attorney's fees in a
contract dispute in Wayland v. City of Arlington.26 In Wayland the city of
Arlington sued a contractor to recover $5,000 due on a promissory note.
The contractor counterclaimed for the reasonable value of materials and la-
bor supplied to the city, and for attorney's fees. 27 The Texas Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals' judgment, which had denied the claim for at-
torneys' fees.28 The supreme court cited Gates to support its holding that
the proprietary contract in Wayland allowed the contractor to recover his
attorney's fees from the city.29
Several decisions of other courts also allowed recovery of attorney's fees
from a public entity in a contract dispute. In Houston Lighting & Power Co.
v. Russo Properties, Inc.3 0 the Houston court of appeals awarded attorney's
fees to a property owner who successfully defended a claim by the power
company and recovered a counterclaim on a sworn account. The Beaumont
court of appeals held a county liable for attorney's fees in Wickersham Ford,
20. Id. at 738. Betty Gates, a dependent, suffered from multiple sclerosis and required a
nurse to attend to her. When the city took over administration of the self-insurance fund, they
denied any further payment of benefits to Mrs. Gates. Gates then sued the city of Dallas for
denial of insurance benefits. After the trial court rendered a partial summary judgment in
favor of Gates for the accrued unpaid benefits, the parties stipulated that the city would pay
future claims under the plan. The only issue before the supreme court was whether recovery of
attorney's fees by Gates was appropriate.
21. Id. at 739. When municipal corporations engage in proprietary functions, as opposed
to governmental functions, they have the same duties and liabilities as private persons and
corporations. Id.
22. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon 1971) (now recodified at TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986)).
23. 704 S.W.2d at 739. The trial court found that Gates had a valid claim based on a
written contract, and that the city denied the claim without reasonable justification. Id. The
court also found that this denial was vexatious and that Gates made his demand more than 30
days prior to bringing his lawsuit. Id.
24. Id. at 740; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon 1971) (now codified at
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986)).
25. 704 S.W.2d at 740. The court remanded the case for a determination of the reasona-
bleness of the $120,000 awarded by the trial court for attorney's fees. Id. at 741.
26. 711 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1986).
27. The trial court allowed Wayland to recover on his counterclaim, but denied his claim
for reasonable attorney's fees. The court of appeals found insufficient evidence to support the
award on the counterclaim and remanded the case for a new trial on the counterclaim, but
affirmed the judgment that denied reasonable attorney's fees. Id. at 233.
28. Id.
29. Id. The supreme court remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial on both
the issue of attorney's fees and the issue of the amount of damages in the counterclaim. Id.
30. 710 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, no writ).
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Inc. v. Orange County3 1 when the county breached a contract for the sale of
automobiles. The Fifth Circuit apparently adopted this approach when it
cited Gates in awarding attorney's fees in Wright v. Del E. Webb Corp.32
III. TORT LIABILITY
Several cases during the Survey period involved tort actions against gov-
ernmental entities. City of San Antonio v. Schautteet 33 addressed the 90-day
notice of claim provision of the San Antonio city charter. The plaintiff in
Schautteet sued the city of San Antonio, alleging that the city negligently
destroyed his house by fire. Farmers Mutual Insurance Association had
paid the policy limit for the loss, signed a subrogation agreement, and inter-
vened in this suit. The plaintiff did not file a written notice of the claim with
the city within 90 days after the fire; thus, the city denied any liability. The
trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the 90-day provision violated
the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution.34
The supreme court held that the court of appeals should not have ad-
dressed this constitutional challenge for two reasons. First, the issue arose
initially in a reply to a brief on appeal. 35 Second, the court could have de-
cided the matter on other grounds asserted during the case. 36 The supreme
court, however, remanded the case to the trial court because a conversation
between the attorney for the insurance company and the city attorney raised
material fact questions about both the city's actual knowledge of the claim
and estoppel due to the city attorney's representations. 37
In City of Denton v. Pagea3 a tenant brought suit for damages under the
31. 701 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ). An automobile dealer-
ship sued the county, alleging a breach of contract for the sale of automobiles. Orange County
filed a cross claim, alleging violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987). The court held that the county was
liable for the dealership's attorney's fees in defending against the cross claim because the jury
found harassment. Id. The court found that attorney's fees may be awarded under TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon 1971) (now codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986)).
32. 786 F.2d 1275, 1277 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). In Wright a subcontractor on a
construction project sued a contractor to recover the cost of removing and replacing certain
work. The contractor in turn sued the regional airport board for indemnification. The con-
tract involved services at the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, and the Fifth Circuit stated that the
airport board was performing governmental functions when it entered into the construction
contract with the contractor. Id. at 1276. The court distinguished between attorney's fees
incurred by the indemnification act and fees incurred in defending the subcontractor's breach
of contract action, and awarded the contractor the fees incurred in defending against the sub-
contractor. Id. at 1278. See also City of Houston v. Lyons Realty, Ltd., 710 S.W.2d 625, 630
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ) (municipal corporation liable for attorney's
fees on matters involving proprietary as opposed to governmental functions).
33. 706 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1986).
34. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
35. 706 S.W.2d at 104-05.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 105.
38. 701 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1986).
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Texas Tort Claims Act.3 9 This tenant, who was injured in a fire in a build-
ing, sued the owner of the building and the city of Denton for his injuries.
The tenant alleged that the city was liable because the fire marshal negli-
gently investigated previous arson attempts in the building. The Texas
Supreme Court found the city of Denton not liable for injuries suffered in the
fire because the city neither exercised any control over the storage building
nor contracted to remedy a dangerous situation there.40 Accordingly, the
facts in Page did not present a case of waiver of governmental immunity
under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
4 1
In City of Gladewater v. Pike42 a family brought an action against a city
for failure to maintain adequate records of the location of an infant's grave
at the municipal cemetery. The plaintiffs sought both actual and punitive
damages. The supreme court found that the operation of a cemetery by a
municipality is a proprietary action. 43 The court also held that in proper
circumstances exemplary damages are recoverable against a municipality op-
erating in its proprietary capacity. 44 The court stated that as a general rule a
municipality may not be held liable for punitive damages unless: (1) the
plaintiff demonstrates "intentional, willful, or grossly negligent" conduct
that shows maliciousness or evil intent; and (2) the plaintiff shows that such
conduct can be imputed directly to a policy-making official of the
municipality.45
In applying its two-prong test in this case the supreme court found that
the plaintiffs satisfied one prong of the test because the city manager of
Gladewater had absolute charge over the cemetery for the city and the city
manager's office had the duty of keeping cemetery records. 46 The plaintiffs
failed to meet the other prong of the test, however, despite that successive
city managers over a period of almost thirty-five years continuously failed to
39. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-.109 (Vernon 1986) (codifying re-
pealed TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970)).
40. 701 S.W.2d at 834-35.
41. Id.
42. 727 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. 1987). Johnny Mack Pike, a two year-old died and was buried
in Gladewater Memorial Park, which is owned and operated by the city of Gladewater. The
family buried Johnny in the middle plot of three plots that they purchased from Gladewater
Memorial Park. Their plan was to bury Johnny's mother and father on either side of their
child's grave. Johnny's mother died in 1976 and the family wanted to bury her beside Johnny.
City officials told the family that the original plots were not vacant and gave the family certifi-
cates of title to different plots in exchange for the original plots. City ordinances required plot
owners' permission to bury someone in a plot. Mrs. Pike was buried in another location in the
cemetery. In 1982 an attempt was made to move Mrs. Pike and Johnny to adjacent graves.
When Johnny's grave was opened, however, the grave contained the casket of an adult. The
city's records did not reflect where Johnny was buried even though city ordinances required
the city to maintain records of the identity and grave location of persons buried in the ceme-
tery. Current and former city managers testified that no records were kept of the identity of
persons buried in the cemetery. City records showed only the original plots that were
purchased by the Pike family. The jury awarded $2,000 in actual damages and $20,000 in
punitive damages.
43. Id. at 519.
44. Id. at 522.
45. Id. at 522, 525.
46. Id. at 523.
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maintain cemetery records. 47 According to the supreme court, this failure at
best showed only indifference; the record did not show that the conduct was
"malicious, evil or even conscious."'4 8 Thus, the plaintiff failed to carry what
the court described as an exceedingly difficult burden, and exemplary dam-
ages were not recoverable. 4 9
Hopkins v. Spring Independent School District 50 involved a claim by the
mother of a student injured at a Spring, Texas, school. The student suffered
injuries after being shoved by another student while the students were un-
supervised in a school room. The mother filed suit under both the Texas
Tort Claims Act51 and the Texas Education Code.52 The mother claimed
that the school was liable for its failure to transport the child to a medical
facility. The Houston court of appeals held that the child's injuries did not
come within the motor vehicles exception to the immunity of both the school
district and the school bus driver under the Texas Tort Claims Act. 53 The
court also held that these injuries did not come under the general immunity
exception in the Texas Education Code. 54
City of Hearne v. Williams" involved a negligence allegation by an air-
plane owner whose airplane was damaged while it was parked, by agree-
47. Id. at 524.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 524-25. Justices Wallace, Campbell, and Gonzales dissented in this case on the
basis that the record did not show that the failure to locate Johnny Pike's grave was attributa-
ble to the city's failure to keep records. Id. at 526.
50. 706 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986), aff'd, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
251 (Feb. 28, 1987).
51. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-.109 (Vernon 1986) (codifying re-
pealed TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970)).
52. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.912(b) (Vernon 1986).
53. 706 S.W.2d at 327; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.051 (Vernon
1986) (codifying repealed TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 19A (Vernon 1970)).
54. 706 S.W.2d at 329. The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that
the injuries did not come within the motor vehicle exception to immunity. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
251, 253 (Feb. 28, 1987).
Other cases during the Survey period involved issues of governmental immunity in medical
aid situations. In Floyd v. Willacy County Hosp. Dist., 706 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), survivors of a decedent who suffered a heart attack after being
denied admission to a hospital brought a wrongful death action against the hospital. The
plaintiffs argued that the hospital negligently failed to use available drugs and equipment to
render emergency medical care to the deceased. The court of appeals held that this case in-
volved non-use and that, therefore, the hospital did not waive its governmental immunity from
liability. Id. at 733.
In Seiler v. Guadalupe Valley Hosp., 709 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), a wife brought a personal injury damages action against the treating physician and
hospital after her husband died from injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident. The wife
alleged that the hospital negligently failed to read the chart notes made by the physician at her
husband's admission. The court held that the limited waiver of sovereign immunity granted in
the Texas Tort Claims Act did not extend to non-use of property by a governmental unit and
that, therefore, the hospital was not liable. Id. at 38.
Parents of a minor child brought a medical malpractice suit against a county hospital dis-
trict in Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Ray, 712 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no
writ). The child in Ray was injured after the hospital administered intravenous fluids to him.
The court of appeals held that the state did not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection by limiting the damages under the Tort Claims Act to $100,000. Id. at 273.
55. 715 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ment, at a municipal airport. The lower court found that the city was
negligent in failing to provide proper tie-down ropes and that this negligence
proximately caused the damage to the airplane. 56 The Waco court of ap-
peals held that the city had the defense of governmental immunity since
article 46d- 15 expressly provided that ownership and operation of a munici-
pal airport by a city are public, governmental functions that are exercised for
a public purpose. 57 The plaintiff, however, alleged that the city had waived
its governmental immunity defense by inserting a provision in its city charter
that the city would never be liable unless it received written notice within
thirty days after an injury. The court denied this claim and held that gov-
ernmental immunity can be waived only by a specific act of the legislature.5 8
The plaintiff further alleged a taking of his property without compensation
or due process in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution. The court denied the claim for a taking because
no evidence indicated that the destruction of the airplane was either inten-
tional or for a public purpose. 59
In Vela v. Cameron County6° parents brought suit under the wrongful
death and survival statutes for the drowning of their child. The child
drowned in the Gulf of Mexico while he and his family were picnicking on
South Padre Island. The court found that the county was not liable because
the county owed no legal duty to warn a swimmer who swam beyond the
area controlled by the county. 6 1 Thus, the waiver of immunity in the Texas
Tort Claims Act did not apply in this case.62
In Mendoza v. City of Corpus Christi6 3 plaintiffs brought a wrongful death
action against the city when a man died after diving off a pier onto land that
adjoined Lake Corpus Christi. The court found that Mendoza was either a
trespasser or a licensee, and therefore, the city was not liable because it com-
mitted no grossly negligent acts or omissions toward Mendoza. 64
A spectator, injured while watching basketball at a game sponsored by a
56. Id. at 376.
57. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 46d-15 (Vernon 1969).
58. 715 S.W.2d at 377.
59. Id.
60. 703 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. Id. at 723.
62. Id. The Vela court stated that a county is a political subdivision of the state and is
thus immune from liability for its negligence or the negligence of its agents, officials, and em-
ployees unless the Texas Tort Claims Act waives this immunity for the acts in question. Id. at
724. The distinction between proprietary and governmental functions does not apply to coun-
ties because the county does not perform any proprietary functions. Id. The Texas Tort
Claims Act provides that, regarding premises defects, the government owes a claimant only
that duty owed by private persons to licensees on private property. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 101.022 (Vernon 1986) (codifying repealed TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-19, § 18(b) (Vernon 1970)). The court determined that the waiver provision of § 101.022
did not apply to this case because the incident did not occur on county premises. 703 S.W.2d
at 724. Considering state liability, the court held that letters to state legislators that com-
plained about the county's failure to provide life-saving facilities on the beach near where the
swimmer drowned, but that did not complain about any fault by the state, did not provide
notice of the claim to the state as required by the Texas Tort Claims Act. Id. at 726.
63. 700 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
64. Id. at 655.
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school district, sued the school district for her injuries in Gravely v. Lewis-
ville Independent School District.65 The court found that the school district's
participation in athletic programs is governmental in nature.66 The school
district, therefore, was immune from suit for injuries sustained by the
spectator.67
In City of Uvalde v. Crow68 James Crow brought suit for nuisance against
the city of Uvalde to recover damages caused by contaminated water from a
sewage treatment plant owned by the city.69 The court found that a city is
not liable for negligent operation of its facilities, and that merely pleading
negligent acts and labeling them a nuisance cannot establish a nuisance
case. 70 In this instance, however, the court found that a nuisance existed. 71
The court held that a city-owned plant that emits smoke or odors or dumps
polluted water or refuse onto another's land is a nuisance.72
In City of San Antonio v. Hamilton73 the plaintiffs filed survival and
wrongful death actions against the city of San Antonio for the drowning of
their adult daughter at a low-water crossing during a flash flood. 74 The court
stated that a city, while performing proprietary functions, is liable for unlim-
ited damages from the negligent acts of its agents and employees. 75 In Ham-
ilton the city of San Antonio, by ordinance, voluntarily assumed the power
to design and construct a low-water crossing for the benefit of the locality,
and thereby became involved in a proprietary function. The court found
that section 18(a) of the Texas Tort claims Act permitted the plaintiffs to
seek unlimited damages under the common law for the city's negligence in
its performance of a proprietary function.76 The court made this finding
65. 701 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. Id. at 957.
67. Id.
68. 713 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
69. In 1979 Crow began operating a greyhound breeding facility on land about 200 yards
below the Uvalde sewage treatment plant. The city plant was allowed to dump up to two
million gallons of effluent a day into Cook's Slough, which ran across Crow's property.
Crow's greyhounds drank from Cook's Slough. Most of the dogs developed serious health
problems, and many of them died. Although Crow attempted to keep the dogs away from
Cook's Slough, his land was flooded on three occasions by water from the sewage plant that
was being used to irrigate adjacent land. His dogs again experienced the same medical
problems. Both parties conceded that the city would be liable only if its operation of the plant
created a nuisance under the nuisance exception to the governmental immunity rule in the
Texas Constitution. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
70. 713 S.W.2d at 156.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 157.
73. 714 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. Undisputed facts established that the city of San Antonio designed and constructed
the temporary water crossing. After a severe rain storm in the upper watershed area Dawn
Hamilton drove her pickup truck into the low-water crossing where the vehicle stalled. Dur-
ing the subsequent flash flood the truck was swept off the crossing, causing Hamilton's death.
The lawsuit alleged common law negligence and alleged that the city was also liable under the
Texas Tort Claims Act for creating both a premises defect and a special defect. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.022, .060 (Vernon 1986) (codifying repealed TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, §§ 14(12), 18(b) (Vernon 1970)).




even though section 18(a) of the Act specifically provides that the Act does
not apply to any proprietary function of a municipality. 77
Young v. City of Killeen 78 involved a suit against the city of Killeen by the
relatives of a suspect who was fatally shot while a patrolman was attempting
to arrest him for possession of narcotics. The court found no basis for hold-
ing the city liable because the suspect's death was not attributable to any
policy of the city of Killeen. 79 The court did find that the officer in question
acted negligently and contrary to good police procedure, but, as the officer's
actions were contrary to city policy, no liability attached to the city.80
IV. CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY
During the Survey period several civil rights case arose out of the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Hamilton v. Rodgers81 a fire de-
partment employee brought a civil rights action against the city and other
individuals for racial harassment and retaliation. The Fifth Circuit found
that under 42 U.S.C. section 198382 the fire department could not be held
liable for its employees' actions because the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not apply under section 1983.83 Absent an official policy that caused
the plaintiff's injury, the city was not liable. 84 Supervisors of the employees,
however, could be held liable for their discriminatory acts.85
77. Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.058 (Vernon 1986) (codifying
repealed TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 18(a) (Vernon 1970)).
78. 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985).
79. Id. at 1351.
80. Id. at 1351, 1353.
81. 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986). Hamilton was a radio technician hired by the Houston
Fire Department. A black man, he soon experienced ugly racial slurs and nasty pranks at the
hands of fellow employees.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
83. 791 F.2d at 443.
84. Id. Liability under § 1983 attaches only for the deprivation of constitutionally pro-
tected rights pursuant to some official policy. Id. Official policy, however, need not be for-
mally announced in a statement or regulation. Instead, a persistent, widespread practice of
city officials or employees, although not officially authorized, may fairly represent a municipal
policy. Id. The district court in Hamilton found that offensive conditions existed to such a
degree that the court could properly deem the conditions to be an official fire department
policy. Id. The court of appeals did not agree. The evidence suggested that although fire
department officers heard of occasional incidents, they did not know or have reason to know
about a persistent racism problem. Id.
Hamilton tried to establish that municipal liability need not be based on widespread prac-
tice, citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986). The
Hamilton court responded, however, that reliance on Pembaur was misplaced. The court
stated that although the Supreme Court in Pembaur held that municipal liability may attach
for a single decision by municipal policy makers under appropriate circumstances, these cir-
cumstances only exist when a decision constitutes "an act of official government policy." 791
F.2d at 443 n. I (quoting Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1298, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 463). Hamilton's claim
was not based on any decision by high-ranking officials responsible for setting final government
policy. The court stated that although a municipal department should strive to end racial
discrimination within its ranks, the department is not liable for every bigoted act of its employ-
ees. Id. at 444. As employers, municipality departments cannot guarantee a working environ-
ment completely free from bigotry. Id.
85. Id. at 442. Only employers are subject to § 1983 liability. Id. The definition of "em-
ployer," however, includes an employer's agents. Id. Courts interpret the statute liberally in
1987]
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In Rhode v. Denson 86 plaintiffs sued a county for the tortious and uncon-
stitutional act of an elected county official. The court found that an elected
constable of a Texas county is not in a policy-making position.87 The
county, therefore, was not liable in a civil rights action for the constable's
unconstitutional acts. 88
Nash v. City of Houston Civic Center89 involved a suit by present and for-
mer employees of the city of Houston who claimed that the city's denying
civil service status to parking attendants at the city civic center while grant-
ing the status to other city employees constituted class and individual dis-
crimination by the city, a violation of civil rights under federal law.90 The
court found no racial discrimination; disparate treatment by the city was
based on the plaintiffs' employment position, not their race. 91 The plaintiffs
had injected race into their cause by pointing out that black parking attend-
ants outnumbered white parking attendants. The court held that such an
argument lost sight of federal civil rights laws.92 Both black and white park-
ing attendants were denied civil service status, while both black and white
employees in other positions were given civil service status.93
In Davis v. City of Dallas94 a class of black plaintiffs brought suit request-
ing an injunction to prohibit the city of Dallas from utilizing certain eligibil-
ity criteria for hiring its police officers.95 The court found that this case was
distinguishable from the Supreme Court decisions in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.96 and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.97 In those cases the Supreme
Court struck down education requirements for jobs that did not involve pro-
fessional-type positions or an unusual degree of risk or public responsibil-
determining the scope of an agency in question. Id. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit determined
Hamilton's supervisors to be agents of the fire department, even though they were only inter-
mediate managers. Id. They had authority over car assignments and shift staffing, and they
used this authority to harm Hamilton. Id. The supervisors also were the ones who filed the
reports that led to the suspension of Hamilton in 1982. The court therefore stated that "'[a]
person is an agent.., if he participates in the decision making process that forms the basis of
the discrimination.'" Id. at 443 (quoting Jones v. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dis-
trict No. 1, 537 F. Supp. 966, 970 (D. Colo. 1982)). Thus, Hamilton's supervisors were liable.
Id.
86. 776 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2891, 90 L. Ed. 2d 978 (1986).
87. 776 F.2d at 108.
88. Id.
89. 800 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1986).
90. The class of black workers were attendants in the parking division of the civic center
department of the city of Houston. They claimed that they had worked the number of hours
that, had they been working as building attendants or stagehands in the auditorium division of
the civic center department, would have entitled them to civil service status, which included
enhanced vacation time, pension benefits, and job security. The class claimed that the denial of
status was discriminatory because it had a disparate impact upon blacks since most of the
parking attendants were black.
91. Id. at 495-96.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 777 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1985).
95. The criteria concerned educational requirements, marijuana usage, and driving
records.
96. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
97. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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ity.98 The Davis court found that the position of an officer in the Dallas
Police Department combined aspects of professionalism and a significant de-
gree of public risk and responsibility.99 The Davis court found that this dis-
tinction was crucial, and affirmed the district court's finding that the city of
Dallas's education requirements had a manifest relationship to the position
of police officer. 00
The Fifth Circuit awarded attorney's fees and then adjusted the award in
a civil rights action against a county in Van Qoteghem v. Gray.'01 The dis-
trict court in Gray determined reasonable attorney's fees and then enhanced
them 100 percent. 10 2 The Fifth Circuit eliminated the enhancement and ad-
justed the award of attorney's fees to reflect a prior award that partially
compensated the plaintiff, a former county employee, for attorney's fees.103
Hill v. City of Houston '04 involved a civil rights action under section 1983
challenging the constitutional validity of a Houston ordinance that made it
illegal to "oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt" a police officer in the execu-
tion of his duty.10 5 The Fifth Circuit held that the ordinance was unconsti-
tutional, and stated that a narrowly drawn statute directed precisely at the
type of conduct the city wished to proscribe would adequately serve the
city's interest.' 0 6 In this instance the statute was not narrowly drawn. 0 7
Moreover, although the plaintiff failed to show that he sustained actual dam-
ages from an arrest, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to reason-
able attorney's fees as the prevailing party on the issue of con-
stitutionality. 10 8
One section 1983 case came out of the Dallas court of appeals. In Spencer
v. City of Seagoville 109 O.B. Spencer brought suit asserting that the city of
Seagoville violated his civil rights under section 1983. Spencer alleged that a
municipal judge and his clerks issued legally insufficient warrants against
Spencer in order to harass Spencer, who had been critical of the city's ad-
ministration.10 The Dallas court of appeals, on appeal from a summary
judgment for the city, held that the doctrine of soverign immunity does not
98. Id.; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
99. 777 F.2d at 211.
100. Id. The court also held that the requirement that applicants not have recent or exces-
sive marijuana usage, as determined by the department's marijuana usage chart, was job-re-
lated. Id. Furthermore, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the city's
requirement involving driving records was job-related. Id.
101. 774 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1985). In Gray a former assistant county treasurer brought a
civil rights action after he was denied the opportunity to address the commissioner's court on
an issue concerning homosexuality and was terminated.
102. Id. at 1338.
103. Id.
104. 789 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1986) (appeal pending).
105. HOUSTON, TEX., CODE § 34-1 Ia.
106. 789 F.2d at 1112-13.
107. Id. at 1112.
.108. Id. at 1113.
109. 700 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
110. Spencer sued the city of Seagoville, Texas, a municipal corporation; Don Smith,
mayor and municipal judge of Seagoville; Sherry Koleszar, secretary of Seagoville and clerk of
its municipal court; and Marian Hoy, deputy clerk of Seagoville's municipal court.
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absolutely bar a section 1983 action against a municipality.1 1 Thus, the
doctrine could not support a summary judgment for the city of Seagoville.. 12
Furthermore, Spencer's failure to notify the city of his claim, under the
Texas Torts Claims Act,1 13 did not bar his section 1983 cause of action.
Citing cases from other jurisdictions, the court stated that several courts
have refused to bar a plaintiff's suit for failure to comply with the notice-of-
claim provisions of a local tort claims act.'1 4 Additionally, the court did not
allow the city of Seagoville to borrow the notice-of-claim provision from the
Texas Tort Claims Act to act as a statute of limitations for Spencer's suit. 115
Since section 1983 has no statute of limitations, courts must borrow a statute
of limitations from state law. 1 6 The Spencer court found, however, that
such a statute could not come from the Texas Tort Claims Act.' 17
Spencer sought individual liability against municipal judge Smith and the
court clerks, but the court provided that all judicial acts enjoy absolute im-
munity unless such acts fall clearly outside the judge's subject matter juris-
diction."18 The court found that the judge in Spencer was acting within his
judicial jurisdiction. 19 Extending this immunity further, the court stated
that court clerks acting in the course of their duties have the same immunity
as judges. 120
V. ZONING
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.12 1 was a significant zoning case
decided during the Survey period. In Playtime Theaters the United States
Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that re-
stricted the location of adult movie theaters from areas within 1000 feet of a
residential area, church, park, or school. The Court held that the zoning
ordinance was a valid response to serious problems associated with adult
theaters; therefore, the ordinance was constitutional. 122
During the Survey period the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Shelton v. City of College Station.123 Shelton and his partner, Jones, were
denied a parking variance by the zoning board of adjustment for the city of
College Station, Texas. After several attempts to negotiate a solution and
after various denials by the zoning board, Shelton and Jones filed suit in
III. 700 S.W.2d at 955.
112. Id.
113. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101 (Vernon 1986) (codifying re-
pealed TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 16 (Vernon 1970)).
114. 700 S.W.2d at 956. The court did not decide the issue of whether the Texas notice-of-
claims provision ever applies to a § 1983 action. Id. The circumstances of the Seagoville case




118. Id. at 958-59.
119. Id. at 958.
120. Id. at 959.
121. 106 S. Ct. 925, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1986).
122. Id. at 93, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 40.
123. 780 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3276, 91 L. Ed. 2d 566 (1986).
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federal district court seeking money damages. Shelton and Jones com-
plained that within little more than a year after denying their last request,
the board granted variances to similarly situated businesses. Shelton and
Jones alleged that these actions denied their substantive due process rights.
They also alleged denial of procedural due process because one of the board
members failed to recuse himself from voting on the plaintiffs' variance re-
quest even though the board member's church was opposed to parking vari-
ances. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city of
College Station. A panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
summary judgment as to the procedural due process claim, but reversed the
summary judgment on the substantive due process claim. 124 On rehearing,
Shelton and Jones also claimed that the board's grants of variances were also
a denial of equal protection. The court did not address the equal protection
claim because it concluded that a rational basis exited for the zoning board's
decision. 125
The court in Shelton held that federal courts must review zoning decisions
according to the same constitutional standards used to review enactments by
state legislatures. 126 This standard assesses whether a conceivable factual
basis exists for the specific decision. 127 The key inquiry focuses on whether
the decision is "at least debatable."' 128 The Shelton court stated, as a matter
of federal constitutional law, that if the zoning authority can articulate a
reason for its decision that is not irrational, then no denial of substantive due
process has occurred. 129 The court found that the board neither treated
Shelton and Jones arbitrarily or capriciously nor denied the pair their sub-
stantive due process.1 30
In Murmur Corp. v. Board of Adjustment 131 the Dallas court of appeals,
sitting en banc, addressed the nonconforming rights regarding the zoning of
a lead smelter in Dallas. In 1984 Murmur acquired a lead smelter and re-
lated facilities from RSR Corporation as part of a Federal Trade Commis-
sion divestiture order. Murmur acquired the property for $25,000 at a
public auction sale ordered by the Federal Trade Commission.' 32 On the




128. Id. at 483.
129. Id. at 485.
130. Id. The dissent criticized the majority's decision on the basis that it transformed zon-
ing boards of adjustment into legislatures so that all actions of every state or municipal agency
would receive the same deference as deliberate enactments of state legislatures. Id. at 486.
Although the dissent approved the majority's standard, the dissent stated that the majority
distorted this standard by equating it with the constitutional standards employed to review
statutes enacted by state legislatures. Moreover, the dissent commented that even though the
majority acknowledged they were not reviewing legislative action, they nevertheless cited cases
that in fact reviewed enactments by legislative bodies. Id.
131. 718 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
132. Murmur's $25,000 bid was the only bid received. The evidence showed that after the
Federal Trade Commission ordered the property sold, RSR allowed the property to deterio-
rate, apparently with the intent to discourage buyers. A serious pollution problem then devel-
oped, which prompted a suit against RSR by the city and the state to enforce compliance with
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next day, the Dallas city attorney petitioned the board of adjustment to ter-
minate the nonconforming use for this property. After a hearing in Septem-
ber 1984, the board unanimously voted to terminate the use of the land as a
lead smelter immediately. The trial court upheld the order of the board of
adjustment.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. 133 Before
addressing the nonconforming use issues, the court found that an attack by
Murmur on the validity of the zoning ordinance because of the city's failure
to give statutory notice1 34 was cured by validation acts subsequently passed
by the Texas Legislature.1 35 The court held that the validation acts are re-
medial and must be liberally construed. 136 Although validation statutes may
not cure constitutional defects, they may cure defects that do not make the
ordinance unconstitutional.' 37
The Murmur court also discussed the amortization technique of terminat-
ing nonconforming uses and limiting the tolerance period required for amor-
tization to the time necessary for recoupment of the landowner's investment
in the structure at the time of the zoning change. 138 The court extensively
analyzed two provisions of the Dallas Development Code. One provision
provides that a nonconforming use must be discontinued under a plan that
amortizes the full value of a structure within a definite time period. 139 The
other provision states that the board must provide a termination date for a
nonconforming use that considers investments in the nonconforming use. 140
The court concluded that the full value of a nonconforming structure may
mean actual dollars invested in the structure, although the term "investment
in a nonconforming use" may also include other costs such as the cost of
removing a nonconforming structure and establishing the business in a dif-
ferent location.14 1
The court further found that termination of a nonconforming use is not
the taking of property without due process that violates article I, section 17
environmental safety standards. Before acquiring the plant in May 1984, Murmur had to
represent to the FTC that it would continue to operate the plant, install pollution control
equipment, comply with applicable environmental regulations, and demolish the smelter and
clean up the site whenever it discontinued the smelting operation. Id. at 801.
133. Id. at 792.
134. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 101 lf(b) (Vernon 1986).
135. 718 S.W.2d at 792. The zoning amendment in question was passed in 1974. Since the
adoption of the 1974 amendment, the legislature has passed four validation statutes: TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 974d-22, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1987); id. art. 1174a-10, § 2(b); id. art.
1174a-11, § 2(b); id. art. 1174a-12, § 2(b).
136. 718 S.W.2d at 793; see Leach v. City of North Richland Hills, 627 S.W.2d 854, 858
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
137. 718 S.W.2d at 793; see City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1970).
In addition, Murmur, as a subsequent purchaser of the property, was subject to a nonconform-
ing use and, therefore, had no standing to complain about a lack of notice to the former owner.
718 S.W.2d at 793; see Leach, 627 S.W.2d at 857.
138. 718 S.W.2d at 794; see City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 777-78
(Tex. 1972).
139. DALLAS, TEX., DEv. CODE § 51-3.102(c)(4) (1983).
140. Id. § 51-4.704(a)(1).
141. 718 S.W.2d at 795.
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of the Texas Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution.' 42 As police power regulations, nonconforming
use provisions are judged by a reasonableness standard. 43 This standard
only requires the regulation to provide a reasonable opportunity to recoup
the owner's actual investment in the nonconforming use; the regulation need
allow nothing for appreciation in the value of land or improvements, or for
expected profit from an acquisition.44
The court then reviewed the evidence to determine whether the order of
the board of adjustment was an abuse of its discretion, 145 and whether sub-
stantial evidence reasonably supported the board's factual determination
concerning the amount of Murmur's investment in the nonconforming
use.146 The court concluded that the board's order for immediate termina-
tion of the nonconforming lead smelter use was an abuse of discretion be-
cause no substantial evidence reasonably supported the conclusion that
Murmur had no investment in the nonconforming use. '47 The court found
that the value of the land could not be lawfully used to offset Murmur's
investment. 148
The court then considered whether any other evidence in the record could
uphold the board's order on any theory of law regardless of the reasons
given by the board in rendering its decision. 14 9 The court found that no
evidence indicated that Murmur's entire investment was in the land and
other facilities with no investment in the smelter.' 50 To support its finding
the court pointed to the Federal Trade Commission order requiring a com-
mitment to operate the lead smelter. ' ' Accordingly, the court reversed the
trial court and rendered a judgment that vacated the board of adjustment's
order and dissolved the injunction prohibiting use of the lead smelter.'5 2
142. Id. at 797.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 798. The court noted that the amount of recoupment for amortization of a
nonconforming use does not equal the compensation for property taken under eminent do-
main. Id. The court cited several cases to support its holding that a limitation of use does not
in itself constitute a taking unless the owner has no substantial use of his property after the
limitation, or unless the limitation appropriates a specific property right for public benefit. Id.
See City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 393-94 (Tex. 1978).
145. 718 S.W.2d at 799; see Nu-Way Emulsions, Inc. v. City of Dalworthington Gardens,
617 S.W.2d 188-89 (Tex. 1981).
146. 718 S.W.2d at 799; see Swain v. Board of Adjustment, 433 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd, n.r.e.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 977 (1970).
147. 718 S.W.2d at 801. On a motion for rehearing, five justices dissented, stating that the
Board had substantial evidence to reach the conclusion that Murmur had no investment in
improvements on the land it purchased and that the operation of the lead smelter was imprac-
tical and unprofitable. Id. at 812-13.
148. Id. at 801.
149. Id.; see City of Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177, 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
150. 718 S.W.2d at 802.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court expressed no opinion on the merits of Murmur's claims for damages or
on whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear that claim; thus, the court remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings. Id.
1987]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
A significant case, SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston,'5 3 arose in Houston,
which does not have a formal zoning ordinance to control land use. Twenty-
three owners of topless bars challenged the constitutionality of a Houston
ordinance that regulated the location, exterior structure, and signage of cer-
tain sexually oriented businesses.' 5 4
The court found that the Houston ordinance was not aimed at banning or
restricting topless dancing, but rather addressed the relocation of sexually
oriented businesses to curb their effect on the surrounding community.15 5
Time, place, and manner regulations that are content neutral are acceptable
when they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do
not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.15 6 The court
found that the ordinance in question was not unconstitutionally vague.' 5 7
The term "sexually oriented business" gave fair notice to the establishments
that they were subject to regulation under the ordinance.15 8
The court also held that the signage provision and the exterior condition
requirements were valid because they regulated the signs themselves rather
than protected activities.159 Furthermore, the court found that a provision
that granted a six-month grace period to existing nonconforming businesses
before the businesses had to discontinue their operations and that further
provided for extensions of the grace period upon proof that an owner of an
existing enterprise could not recoup his investment before the expiration of
the grace period was a reasonable and thus valid amortization scheme. 16
The court found that a provision of the ordinance that required an opera-
tor to furnish a list of all employees or contractors involved in providing the
enterprise's services was unconstitutional.' 6' The court also found that a
153. 636 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
154. Houston adopted the ordinance in 1983. The plaintiffs in this action were specifically
exempted from the 1983 ordinance. In 1985, however, the Texas legislature amended the
enabling statute to allow cities, including Houston, to regulate sexually oriented businesses
that previously had been exempted. The city of Houston then enacted an ordinance to regulate
such businesses.
The ordinance required owners of sexually oriented businesses to obtain permits to com-
mence or continue operations. The ordinance regulated the location of these enterprises within
so many feet of a school or church, another permitted enterprise, or a tract that was 75%
residential in character. The ordinance placed restrictions on signage and exteriors of the
enterprises and contained express requirements for obtaining permits.
155. 636 F. Supp. at 1366.
156. Id. In analyzing this issue the court found that a city's interest in preserving the
quality of urban life must receive great respect; thus, the city had identified a problem requir-
ing an exercise of its police supervisory powers to provide for the welfare of its citizens. Id.
157. Id. at 1368.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1369. The restrictions allowed modest, subdued advertising. The court found
that the restrictions were appropriate in order to prevent a decline in the values of surrounding
properties and the deterioration of neighborhoods. Id.
160. Id. at 1371. The amortization scheme was reasonable for several reasons. First,
amortization is a valid technique for eliminating nonconforming uses. Id. Second, the regula-
tion was not an unlawful taking since not every regulation that adversely affects economic
interests of a business violates the fifth amendment as an unlawful taking without adequate
compensation. Id. Third, the amortization scheme was reasonable since the city provided
adequate alternative sites for relocation of the plaintiffs' businesses. Id.
161. Id. at 1372.
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portion of the ordinance that required disclosure of all aliases of the business
operator was an unconstitutional invasion of the operator's right to pri-
vacy. 1 62 The SDJ court likewise struck down a provision that required per-
mit applicants to comply fully with all state, federal, and local regulations
affecting the conduct of the applicant's business before receiving a permit. 163
The court found that this requirement did not further a legitimate govern-
mental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 164
Young, Wilkinson & Roberts v. City of Abilene 165 addressed the issue of
how distance should be measured when a zoning ordinance restricts the sale
of alcoholic beverages from within 300 feet of a school, church, or hospi-
tal. 166 In this case the appellant argued that although it did not comply with
the Abilene zoning ordinance, it did comply with the Texas Alcoholic Bever-
age Code (TABC) section 109.33.167 Under section 109.33 distance was
measured along street fronts, 168 and according to those measurements, the
appellant's property was not within 300 feet of a church, school, or hospital.
The court held that the city's zoning ordinance, which called for straight-
line measurements, did not conflict with the TABC. 169 The court held that
the state statutes governing local regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages
do not preclude a city from making measurements in a straight line rather
than along street fronts. 170 The court reasoned that Texas courts have long
allowed home rule cities to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages through
zoning. 171
In Abilene Oil Distributors, Inc. v. City ofAbilene 172 Abilene Oil Distribu-
tors owned a convenience store in an area zoned "heavy commercial." The
company sought a license to sell alcoholic beverages for off-premise con-
sumption. The applicable zoning ordinance permitted a liquor store in a
heavy commercial zone, but the use was subject to special conditions; the
store had to be a specified distance from public schools. The board of adjust-
ment denied the company's request for a variance from these special condi-
tions. Abilene Oil Distributors argued that the city zoning ordinance was
unconstitutional because the applicable state statute173 and the city zoning
ordinance had different methods of measuring the distance from a public
school to a place that sells alcoholic beverages. The court held that under
the terms of the state statute in question, a zoning ordinance may be incon-
sistent with the state statute if the ordinance imposes standards that are




165. 704 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. See SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 636 F. Supp. 1359, 1377 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
167. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 109.33 (Vernon 1987).
168. See id.
169. 704 S.W.2d at 382.
170. Id.
171. Id. This case had one dissent. Id. at 383 (Dickenson, J., dissenting).
172. 712 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 101 lj (Vernon 1963).
174. Id. at 645.
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B & B Vending Co. v. City of Garland175 involved a city of Garland ordi-
nance that prohibited the location of skill or pleasure coin-operated ma-
chines within 300 feet of a church, a school, a hospital, or residentially zoned
property. B & B sought a declaratory judgment that the city's ordinance
conflicted with a state statute, article 8814,176 and was therefore, unconstitu-
tional. The court noted that article 8814 provides that a city must, for zon-
ing purposes, treat coin-operated amusement machines as having the same
use as the principal use of the property where they are exhibited, except that
cities may restrict the location of such machines within 300 feet of a church,
school, or hospital.' 77 To the extent that the ordinance imposed additional
restrictions beyond that exception, the court in B & B Vending Co. declared
that the Garland ordinance was unenforceable. 178
In Crow v. City of Sweetwater 179 Brooks Mayberry, Inc. requested a vari-
ance that would permit an insurance office in a house located in an area
zoned for residential uses. Charles Crow and other property owners ap-
peared at a public hearing before the Sweetwater Board of Adjustment to
oppose the request. The board granted the request. Crow filed a petition for
writ of certiorari with the district clerk. The clerk issued citations on that
same day to Brooks Mayberry and the city of Sweetwater, but the petition
was not called to the judge's attention within ten days after the board of
adjustment decision was filed in the office of the board. The trial court dis-
missed the action for lack of jurisdiction.
The court in Crow modified the rule stated in City of Lubbock v.
Bownds 180 by providing that the three procedural steps that must be taken to
invoke district court jurisdiction under article 101 lg' 8 ' are: (1) a petition
must be filed with the court's clerk or deputy and presented to the judge
within ten days after the board's decision has been filed in the office of the
board of adjustments; (2) if the court allows a writ of certiorari, the writ
must be issued and served upon the board of adjustments; and (3) the board
must have either made its return or failed to respond within the time allowed
175. 711 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no writ).
176. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8814 (Vernon Supp. 1987). The city sought a declar-
atory judgment in a counterclaim that alleged that art. 8814 was unconstitutional because the
Texas House bill that amended art. 8814 encompassed two distinct subjects in its title and text
in violation of TEX. CONST. art. III, § 35. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional.
The court of appeals reversed. 711 S.W.2d at 133. The appellate court held that the title to
the amending statute clearly expressed the portion of article 8814 that limited the zoning pow-
ers of all political subdivisions. Id. at 134. Thus, under TEX. CONST. art. III, § 35, which
voids portions of enactments the subject of which is not expressed in the title of the enactment,
article 8814 was valid. Id.
177. 711 S.W.2d at 133.
178. Id. at 134.
179. 715 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
180. 623 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ). The Bownds court previously
held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 101 Ig
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987) to review the merits of a case from a board of adjustment until (1) a
petition has been timely filed, (2) a writ of certiorari has been issued and served on the board,
and (3) the board has made its return. 623 S.W.2d at 755.
181. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 1011g (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
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by article 101 1g.18 2
In Battles v. Board of Adjustment & Appeals 18 an owner of property
neighboring a subdivision challenged the board of adjustment's grant of lot
width and setback variances for the subdivision. Battles contended that the
board erred in granting certain variances because the only substantial evi-
dence of undue hardship was self-imposed financial hardship. Battles also
alleged that the decisions of both the board and the trial court were void
because the granting of variances represented a change of zoning by the
board. The board found that the owner of the property had installed streets,
alleys, sewers, and utility lines for the subdivision at a cost of $337,000, had
sold nine of the subdivision lots, and had started construction on several
other lots. The board stated that commencement of the construction had
given the owner and his assigns nonconforming use rights because the con-
struction was lawful when it was commenced.
Analyzing the case, the court of appeals found that the loss of four lots
would be the only hardship on the developer.18 4 This financial hardship is
not substantial evidence of an unnecessary hardship, which is required for a
variance under article 1011g.18 5  The court, therefore, denied the
variances. 186
In Southland Addition Homeowner's Association v. Board of Adjust-
ments 187 the court found that the preservation of trees qualified as a special
circumstance under article 1011g.' 8 8 The Wichita Falls Board of Adjust-
ment, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by granting a variance from the
zoning ordinance in question.' 8 9 The court stated that literal enforcement of
the ordinance terms would have caused the owner of the land to endure
unnecessary hardship. 190
VI. PLATTING
In Peacock v. City of Murphy 191 Peacock sued to compel the city of Mur-
phy, Texas, to issue building permits and utility connections for four lots.
The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the city, holding that
Peacock had never filed a subdivision plat with the governing body of Mur-
phy. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals and held that fact issues existed as to whether Peacock filed
preliminary and final plats for approval and whether the city was estopped
to deny approval of the subdivision plat. 192
182. 715 S.W.2d at 167-68. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
case. Id. at 168.
183. 711 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
184. Id. at 300.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 710 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
188. Id. at 196.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 706 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
192. Id. at 649. Peacock filed an affidavit stating that he had filed preliminary and final
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In City of Azle v. Texian Developer, Inc. 193 the city of Azle sought to en-
join Texian from continuing to build a subdivision located near the city of
Pelican Bay. The subdivision in question was within the extraterritorial ju-
risdiction of Pelican Bay, and not within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
the city of Azle. The court held that inside its extraterritorial jurisdiction a
city has independent authority to regulate subdivisions under Texas statu-
tory law. 194 The court held, therefore, that the city of Azle was not entitled
to a temporary injunction that enjoined Texian from building a subdivision
until Azle approved the plat. 195
In City of San Marcos v. R. W. McDonald Development Corp.19 6 the city of
San Marcos sought a declaratory judgment that a developer had no right to
record its final subdivision plat and no right to proceed with development of
a subdivision because the developer had not complied with the city subdivi-
sion ordinances. 197 The city also claimed that the developer obtained the
approval of the city's planning commission by misrepresenting that the
water supply company serving the subdivision was state-approved. The
court found as a matter of law that the developer's misrepresentations were
sufficient to establish legal fraud. 198 The court vacated the plat for all pur-
poses because the developer's misrepresentations had a tendency to deceive
the city and the planning commission and to injure the public interest, and
because the developer failed to comply with city ordinances. 99
In Projects American Corp. v. Hilliard200 a developer owned property lo-
cated wholly within Van Zandt County but outside the corporate limits of
any city. The developer prepared a plat in accordance with article 6702-1,
section 2.401. 201 The developer then tendered the plat to the commissioners
court of Van Zandt County. After hearing testimony by land owners oppos-
plats and plans with the mayor and city secretary of Murphy. Peacock alleged that the mayor
accepted the filing of the plat and plan and promised Peacock a hearing before the city council.
Additionally, Peacock alleged that the city subjectively enforced its subdivision regulations,
requiring him to include things on his plat that were not included on other subdivision plats
approved by the city.
193. 698 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
194. Id. at 265; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 970(a), 974(a), 6626(aa) (Vernon
1963).
195. 698 S.W.2d at 266.
196. 700 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
197. San Marcos is a home rule city with extraterritorial jurisdiction extending two miles
beyond its corporate limits. The developer, McDonald, owned a 50-acre tract that was located
within this extraterritorial jurisdiction. McDonald alleged that city officials led him to believe
that the subdivision improvements would not have to comply with an interim ordinance that
was in effect at the time of the subdividing. McDonald never complied with the interim ordi-
nance requirements. Although McDonald requested a variance from the interim ordinance,
neither the city council nor the planning commission formally granted such a variance.
McDonald also claimed that after the planning commission approved the preliminary plat,
his engineer wrote to the city director stating that the planning commission had granted Mc-
Donald a variance from all the interim ordinance's requirements. The public works director
received the engineer's letter, but did not discuss its contents with other city officials. Instead,
the director merely routed the letter to other departments.
198. 700 S.W.2d at 678.
199. Id.
200. 711 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no writ).
201. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6702-1, § 2.401 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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ing the proposed subdivision development the commissioners court refused
to approve the plat. The court held that under section 2.401(e) the commis-
sioners court did not have discretionary authority to approve plats. 20 2 If a
submitted plat meets all statutory requirements, the commissioner's court
must approve the plat; the commissioners cannot impose additional require-
ments on the plat. 20 3
VII. INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Inverse Condemnation
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of inverse condemnation in
City of Austin v. Avenue Corp.2°4 in which access to a restaurant was par-
tially restricted by construction of a street and sidewalk in front of the res-
taurant. The restaurant owner sued the city for lost profits, and the Texas
Supreme Court held that temporary partial restriction of access to a restau-
rant did not establish a taking that would allow the restaurant owner to
recover lost profits.20 5 The supreme court said
in order to show a material and substantial interference with access to
one's property, it is necessary to show that there has been a total but
temporary restriction of access; or a partial but permanent restriction of
access; or a temporary limited restriction of access brought about by an
illegal activity or one that is negligently performed or unduly
delayed. 20 6
B. Condemnation in General
Southwestern Bell, in Gully v. Southwestern Bell Co., 20 7 had entered into
an agreement in 1953 whereby, in exchange for nominal consideration, Bell
received an easement and permission to lay a communications cable at the
edge of certain property. The easement also provided that if four special
conditions were met, Bell, if given ninety days' notice from the landowner,
would remove its lines and relocate them. Hazel Gully acquired the land
hindered by this easement in 1978. After she discovered that Bell had buried
a communications line beneath her property, Gully requested that Bell re-
move the cable. Bell initially disputed whether the four conditions under the
easement agreement had been satisfied. Yet, at some point and soon after
receiving the initial communication from Gully, Bell agreed to move the
cable. After further investigation, Bell discovered that removal of the cable
would be very costly, and the company informed Gully that the cable would
remain. Gully filed a petition in state court seeking declaratory relief. In the
meantime the ninety-day period had expired. Thus, if the four conditions
had been met, Bell was in breach of the agreement with Gully. A month
202. 711 S.W.2d at 389.
203. Id.
204. 704 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1986).
205. Id. at 13.
206. Id.
207. 774 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1985).
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later Bell filed its answer to Gully's complaint and also removed the case to
federal court. Seven months later Bell filed a counterclaim for condemna-
tion. The court allowed Gully to recover the value of the condemned land.
The court also allowed Gully to recover damages for breach of contract
based on Bell's refusal, until condemnation proceedings, to remove the
cables in accordance with the easement agreement. 20 8
In Tejas Gas Corp. v. Herrin 209 the condemnor challenged the right of the
condemnee to appeal from condemnation proceedings because the con-
demnee had taken the condemnation award from the court registry. The
Texas Supreme Court held that in such circumstances the condemnee can-
not contend the taking was unlawful even though the condemnee replaces
the entire award, with interest. 210
In Zak v. Sanchez211 the court of appeals ruled on the question of whether
interference with the use of a roadway constituted an unconstitutional tak-
ing.2 12 The roadway was located on private property. The court found,
however, that the landowner had impliedly dedicated the strip of land in
question to the public; therefore, no taking occurred.2 1 3
In Uvalde County v. Barrier214 the court of appeals examined the elements
of an implied dedication. In Barrier a landowner brought suit after county
employees entered his property and cut a new road along the property's
western boundary and constructed a new low water crossing. The court
found an implied dedication, but awarded the landowner the cost of the re-
pairs that were necessary for his land.215
City of Dallas v. Martin 216 addressed the right to possession of condemned
property after special commissioners have made an award. The Dallas court
of appeals held that once the city had deposited funds equal to the commis-
sioners' award in the court registry, the city had the right to possess the
condemned land.217
The Texas Supreme Court in Klein Independent School District v. Four-
teenth Court ofAppeals 218 addressed the right to possess land pending litiga-
tion. In Klein a power company instituted condemnation proceedings to
acquire a one-hundred-foot strip of land owned by a school district. The
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 47(f) in denying the power company supersedeas of
an injunction prohibiting the company from using its facilities on the land
pending appeal of the condemnation proceeding. 219
208. Id. at 1295.
209. 716 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 1986).
210. Id.
211. 700 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
212. Id. at 262.
213. Id.
214. 710 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
215. Id. at 747.
216. 711 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
217. Id. at 289.
218. 720 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1986).
219. Id. at 88.
[Vol. 41
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
In Devco, Ltd. v. Murray220 the condemnor dropped its court action after
discovering an error in the metes and bounds description of a proposed ease-
ment. The court of appeals held that the proceeding could be dismissed and
then refiled to correct this metes and bounds description. 221 The court
found that the condemnor did not institute the second proceeding to obtain a
lower value on the land in question, but merely to correct the description
error.222
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Gordon 223 a court dismissed con-
demnation proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that attor-
ney's fees were not allowable in a judicial dismissal of a condemnation
proceeding. 224
The Fort Worth court of appeals in Ratcliff v. City of Keller225 upheld a
condemnation of land for construction of a storm sewer. The landowner
objected to the condemnation proceedings by asserting that the public im-
provement from the sewer would serve the land of only one individual. The
court stated that although a public improvement does not directly serve all
citizens the improvement may still be a public use. 226
Two court of appeals decisions addressed the proper measure of damages
in a condemnation award. In Bauer v. Lavaca-Navidad River Authority227
the river authority sought to condemn a portion of a landowner's property
for a pipeline easement. The court noted a number of factors to be taken
into account in assessing a condemnation award, including damages the con-
demnor might inflict to the condemned property, as well as everything that
affects the value of the property.228
In City of Houston v. Wolfe2 2 9 the city of Houston challenged the amount
of interest awarded by a trial court because the trial court compounded pre-
judgment interest on a daily basis. The city argued that the award should
not have been compounded. The city cited City of Austin v. Foster230 as
holding that prejudgment interest on eminent domain judgments should not
be compounded. 231 The Wolfe court stated, however, that the supreme
court in Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc.232 overruled Foster, and the
Wolfe court thus upheld the compounding of prejudgment interest in an em-
inent domain case. 233
220. 705 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986). [Editor's Note: After the printing of
this Article the Texas Supreme Court affirmed this case. 731 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. 1987).]
221. Id. at 838.
222. Id. at 839.
223. 705 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
224. Id.
225. 698 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
226. Id.
227. 704 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
228. Id. at 109.
229. 712 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd).
230. 623 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
231. Wolfe, 712 S.W.2d at 229.
232. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
233. 712 S.W.2d at 229.
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In Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. County of Nueces234 Leeco had deeded fifty
acres of land to Nueces County in 1960 for so long as the county maintained
the property as a public park. The deed further provided that the land
would revert to Leeco if the county did not abide by numerous specific con-
ditions. In 1983 the county commenced condemnation proceedings against
Leeco's retained interest. 235 Leeco contended that the county was estopped
from taking the possible reverter interest and that the taking violated public
policy. Leeco argued that by accepting the gift of the fifty acres in 1960, the
county was estopped from later exercising its eminent domain powers to take
Leeco's reversionary interest as established in the deed. Leeco contended
that, if the court allowed the county to acquire his reversionary interest, the
county would no longer need to abide by the restrictions in the deed and
would thus defeat the intentions of Leeco, the grantor, in making the gift.
The court noted that counties have power to appropriate lands within their
boundaries for public purposes.236 This appropriation may include the fee
simple title to land and any lesser interest in that land. 237 The court could
find no authority to estop a county from asserting its condemnation powers
to take the reversionary interest of a party who grants land to the county. 238
State v. Sungrowth VI, California, Ltd.239 involved apartments on a tract
of land adjacent to Highway 290 in the city of Austin. In the process of
widening the highway, the state initiated eminent domain proceedings to ac-
quire a right-of-way adjacent to the land. None of the apartment buildings
were on the proposed right-of-way, but the right-of-way fell within one foot
of some buildings. The landowner sought lost business profits attributable to
the anticipated construction work adjacent to the apartments. The court
stated that a landowner may not recover lost business profits of this type in
an eminent domain proceeding when the construction work would not inter-
fere with access to the appellee's property.24°
234. 716 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, writ granted).
235. The trial court granted summary judgment for the county, and held that Leeco was
only entitled to nominal damages as compensation for its interest. A subsequent bench trial
proceeded to determine the amount of nominal damages Leeco deserved. The court awarded
Leeco $10.
236. Id. at 617.
237. Id. In analyzing the public policy issue, the court found that policy factors indicated
strong public support for the condemnation. Id.
238. Id.
239. 713 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
240. Id. at 177. The court provided, however, that evidence of lost profits is admissible to
establish the value of land taken or the diminution in value of the remainder, or to substantiate
opinion evidence about those values. Id. The court noted that in a suit for inverse condemna-
tion a landowner may recover lost profits caused by a material and substantial interference
with access to property. Id. The court stated that this interference must occur in one of the
three ways specified in City of Austin v. Avenue Corp., 704 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. 1986). Sun-
growth VI, 713 S.W.2d at 177. Using this reasoning the court indicated that a landowner
might recover lost profits, in addition to both the value of the land taken and the diminution in
value of the remainder, when part of the property is taken in eminent domain, and the taking is
coupled with a material and substantial interference with access to the remainder and with
business conducted on the remainder. Id. Such a recovery did not apply in Sungrowth VI,





Upshur County Commissioners Court v. Central Education Agency 241 in-
volved the decision of both the state board of education and the commis-
sioner of education to refuse a statutorily sufficient petition for detachment
and annexation brought pursuant to the Texas Education Code.242 In July
1983 the Upshur County commissioners court, sitting as the county board of
education, received a petition seeking detachment and annexation. Upon
completion of a hearing the commissioners found that the proponents of the
detachment and annexation had established each of the elements prescribed
for such annexation and that the petition was legally sufficient. Accordingly,
the commissioners court ordered that the property in question be detached
from the Union Grove Independent School District and annexed to the Gil-
mer Independent School District. Union Grove appealed to the state com-
missioner of education. After his review the commissioner determined that
although the proponents had satisfied the necessary elements required by the
Texas Education Code, he would not allow detachment and annexation be-
cause the proponents were seeking to avoid a higher tax rate present in the
Union Grove Independent School District. The Austin court of appeals held
that the commissioner and the state board of education exceeded their statu-
tory authority in denying a statutorily sufficient petition upon grounds that
were not prescribed in the statute.243 According to the court, the Texas
Education Code did not permit the commissioner or the state board to refuse
an otherwise sufficient petition only because of the motives of the proponents
of the petition or the wisdom of the detachment and annexation under
consideration. 24"
In City of Houston v. Savely 245 the court of appeals dealt with a challenge
to certain annexations by the city of Houston. The court found that despite
allegations that the annexations clashed with the jurisdiction of other cities,
the areas were within Houston's extraterritorial jurisdiction and that the
areas were not within the extraterritorial jurisdiction or corporate bounda-
ries of any other city.246 The annexation was also challenged because alleg-
edly the description of the property in the annexation ordinances did not
close. The court, deciding the issue as a matter of law, disagreed. 247 The
court also dismissed a challenge to the annexation ordinances that alleged
that the city failed to give all interested parties an opportunity to be heard on
the annexation. 248
City of Houston v. Lyons Realty, Ltd.249 involved obligations assumed by
241. 697 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985). [Editor's Note: After the printing of this
Article the Texas Supreme Court affirmed this case. 731 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1987).]
242. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 19.261 (Vernon 1985).
243. 697 S.W.2d at 447.
244. Id. at 446.
245. 708 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
246. Id. at 887, 889.
247. Id. at 887-89.
248. Id. at 889; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 970(a), § 6 (Vernon 1963).
249. 710 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, no writ).
1987]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the city of Houston due to annexation. Harris County Municipal Utility
District (MUD) 39 had issued Lyons Realty a promissory note for $63,863
before the district was annexed by the city of Houston. The court held that
the MUD had the constitutional and statutory authority to make the note,
and the court required the city to honor the indebtedness.250 As to attor-
ney's fees the court found that although article 2226 provides that a munici-
pal corporation may be required to pay attorney's fees for liability, article
2226 only extends to matters involving proprietary functions, not govern-
mental functions.251 Operation and maintenance of a sanitary sewer system
by a municipality is a governmental function; therefore, attorney's fees were
not recoverable in this case. 252
IX. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Hammond v. City of Dallas253 presented the issue of whether the Dallas
city charter empowered the city manager and city civil service board to in-
crease the punishment assessed by the police chief in disciplinary actions
when those actions are appealed to the city manager. The relevant portions
of the Dallas city charter provided that the chief of police had the exclusive
right to suspend for a definite time or discharge any of the officers or em-
ployees under his control.254 The Texas Supreme Court found through rules
of statutory construction that neither the city manager nor the civil service
trial board had authority to increase the punishment given by the chief of
police. 255 The city charter only authorized the city manager to affirm or
reduce, not enhance the police chief's decision.256
In Horrocks v. City of Grand Prairie257 the supreme court held that any
decision of a civil service commission concerning a suspension is appealable
to district court. Horrocks was suspended from his job as a policeman for
the city of Grand Prairie. Horrocks appealed this action to the civil service
commission, which held a hearing and orally affirmed his suspension. The
250. Id. at 628, 630.
251. Id. at 630; see TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986) (codify-
ing repealed TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon 1970)).
252. 710 S.W.2d at 630.
253. 712 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. 1986).
254. The charter required, when any officer or employee was suspended or discharged, the
chief of police to certify the fact in writing, stating the cause for the action, to the city man-
ager. An officer or employee suspended or discharged had five days from receipt of notice of
such action to demand a hearing before the city manager. Upon the demand, the charter
required the city manager to inquire into the cause of the suspension or discharge and render
judgment. If the city manager sustained the charge, he had discretion to order a suspension,
reduction in rank, discharge, or other equitable measures.
255. 712 S.W.2d at 498. According to the court, the charter was interpreted by reading it
as a whole and harmonizing its various provisions as far as possible. Id. The court stated that
courts must consider every word, phrase, and expression as if each had been deliberately cho-
sen and used for a purpose. Id. Further, courts must strictly construe grants of power to
municipal corporations. Id. A final canon of statutory construction used by the court was
that when a statute contains both a broad and a restrictive clause, the restrictive clause con-
trols the broad clause. Id.
256. Id. at 499.
257. 704 S.W.2d 17, 17 (Tex. 1986).
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court of appeals held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider an
appeal from a civil service commission order that was not written and timely
filed. The supreme court reversed that decision. 25 8
In Grounds v. Tolar Independent School District 2 59 the Supreme Court of
Texas addressed a case that concerned the rights of a teacher under the
Texas Education Code. The Tolar Independent School District hired Gary
Grounds as a teacher under a one-year term contract. At the end of a year
Grounds signed a new one-year contract to teach and coach football. The
contract provided that Grounds would be subject to assignment and reas-
signment at any time during the contract term.
Halfway through the second contract term the school district adopted a
policy of statutory biannual evaluation and probation. Accordingly, the dis-
trict evaluated Grounds and notified him that they would not renew his con-
tract. Grounds requested a hearing; the school district refused. Grounds
then appealed to the Texas commissioner of education, who reversed the
school district's decision on the grounds that the district's new probationary
period did not apply to Grounds because he had been hired prior to the
adoption of the new probationary policy. Instead of appealing the commis-
sioner's decision to a Travis County district court as provided by the Texas
Education Code 2 60 the school board filed an action for a declaratory judg-
ment in the Hood County district court. Before trial Grounds refused a new
contract at a lower salary as a teacher without coaching duties.
The district court, sitting without a jury, ruled in favor of the school dis-
trict. The court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court reversed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals and reinstated the order of the commissioner of
education. 26 I The supreme court held that the school district did not follow
the statutory prerequisites for review and that the district must file any ap-
peal in district court and name the commissioner of education as a party.262
Since the district failed to fulfill these requirements, it did not invoke the
jurisdiction of the Hood County district court.263 The supreme court also
considered the contention that the school district did not need to exhaust all
of its administrative remedies because this case only involved questions
about the administration of school law.264 The supreme court rejected that
argument by holding that although the doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies generally does not apply to pure questions of law, interpreta-
tion of the rights of the parties pursuant to the contracts in this case did not
present a pure question of law.265
In Wells v. Dallas Independent School District 266 Weldon Wells learned
258. Id.
259. 707 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1986).
260. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.201-.211 (Vernon Supp. 1987) (Term Contract
Non-Renewal Act).
261. 707 S.W.2d at 893.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 892.
265. Id.
266. 793 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1986).
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from a local television broadcast that he had been fired from his post as
assistant superintendent of support services for the Dallas Independent
School District (DISD). Wells sued the DISD in federal district court, seek-
ing damages under federal law267 on the grounds that this summary dismis-
sal violated his fourteenth amendment due process rights. 268 On the DISD's
motion for summary judgment, the district court found, and the DISD con-
ceded, that the DISD deprived Wells of his property interest in his job with-
out due process. The district court concluded, however, that the due process
violation had been cured to a limited extent by a post-termination adminis-
trative council hearing.269 Accordingly, the district court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the DISD.270 The court reserved for the
finder of fact the question of whether Wells was entitled to damages because
of the pre-termination deprivation of due process. 271 At trial a jury awarded
Wells $1.9 million for the pre-termination deprivation of due process, but
the district court reduced this award to $250,000 by remittitur. The court
awarded approximately $100,000 to Wells for attorney's fees. Both parties
appealed.
The Fifth Circuit found that genuine issues of material fact existed on the
record, and thus found that the district court erred in rendering partial sum-
mary judgment in favor of the DISD.272 The court further found that the
jury's damage award was so excessive that the verdict reflected passion and
prejudice. 273 The court vacated the partial summary judgment in favor of
the DISD, the jury verdict in favor of Wells, and the district court's award
of attorney's fees, and remanded the matter for a new trial. 274
Myrtle Springs Reverted Independent School District v. Hogan 275 involved
a suit by Carolyn Hogan against the school district alleging that the district
breached its contract with Hogan when the district did not renew her posi-
tion as a part-time principal. Hogan sought contract damages and damages
for loss of earning capacity and mental anguish.2 76 The court found that the
267. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
268. At his dismissal Wells was in the third year of a five-year contract with the DISD.
Several weeks after Wells sued following his dismissal, the DISD notified Wells about eight
charges against him, and about the date of a hearing before the DISD Administrative Council.
That hearing transpired during three weeks in January and February 1980. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the administrative council unanimously sustained the school superintendent's
earlier decision to fire Wells.
During April and May 1980 Wells received a second hearing, this time from the DISD
Board of Trustees. That body affirmed the discharge decision. In the meantime, Wells was
indicted on criminal charges related to the alleged grounds of his dismissal. The state acquit-
ted Wells on these charges and exonerated him of any criminal liability.
269. 793 F.2d at 681.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 682.
273. Id. at 684.
274. Id.
275. 705 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
276. Hogan worked for several years as part-time principal and full-time teacher in the
Myrtle Springs School District. The Myrtle Springs School Board threatened to fire Hogan if
she did not resign her part-time principal job. Although she specifically asked for a list of
grievances, the school board did not give her any reason for dismissal. Hogan rejected the
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school district failed to follow procedures set out in its own written policies
for nonrenewal of employees when it decided not to rehire Hogan. 2 77 Ac-
cordingly, the school district breached its contract with Hogan. The court
stated: "The regulations and operational policies adopted by a school board
before making a contract of employment with a teacher form part of the
contract, and the teacher's employment is subject thereto. ' 278 The court
held that the correct measure of damages for breach of the employment con-
tract was the present cash value of the employment contract if the contract
had not been breached, less any amounts that the employee should have
earned through other employment using reasonable diligence. 279 The court,
however, refused to allow damages for loss of earning capacity and mental
anguish by holding that these damages do not come within the foreseeable
damages rule in cases involving breach of employment contracts. 28 0
In Fireman's & Policeman's Civil Service Commission v. Burnham28 1 the
Austin chief of police ordered officer Burnham to take a polygraph examina-
tion during an investigation associated with a rape complaint. When Burn-
ham refused to do so, the police chief fired him. Because a police officer has
an obligation to prevent crime even when off duty, the court of appeals held
that the district court erred in concluding that the alleged rape was not re-
lated to Burnham's employment with the Austin Police Department. 28 2 The
polygraph examination did not violate any of Burnham's constitutional
rights because it related to his official duties. 283 The department was, there-
fore, within its authority in dismissing Burnham for refusing to obey a direct
order to submit himself to the examination. 28 4
City of San Antonio v. Rosow 285 involved the termination of a city of San
Antonio employee from a classified civil service position. The employee's
supervisor gave written notice of this termination in compliance with the San
Antonio municipal civil service rules.286 Pursuant to the civil service rules,
the employee appealed her termination to the municipal civil service com-
teacher's contract and requested a formal hearing by the school board. At its hearing the
board gave Hogan a list of eight grievances and confirmed its earlier decision not to renew her
part-time principal's position. The list of grievances contained none of the reasons for dismis-
sal listed in the Myrtle Springs School District Board policies.
277. 705 S.W.2d at 709.
278. Id. at 710.
279. Id.
280. Id. The court recognized that damages for loss of earning capacity and mental
anguish are traditionally recoverable in personal injury suits. Id. The court noted, however,
that Hogan's suit against the school district, to the extent that it sounded in tort, could not
succeed against the district's governmental immunity. Id.
281. 715 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
282. Id. at 812. The court of appeals held that the law proscribes unwarranted intrusion
into a person's private affairs. Id. at 811. The court stated, however, that the government, as
an employer, may question its employees concerning matters relevant to the employment. If
an employee refuses to answer matters concerning the performance of duties, the government
may discipline or even dismiss the employee. Id. Constitutional principles do not proscribe
such a dismissal or discipline, absent coerced waiver of constitutional rights. Id.
283. Id. at 812.
284. Id. Judge Brady dissented in this case. Id.
285. 716 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ granted).
286. See id. at 634. The supervisor terminated Rosow for alleged "acts of incompetency,
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mission. After a hearing the commission recommended that the city man-
ager reinstate her. The city manager disregarded the commission's
recommendation and approved the termination.
The employee filed suit, alleging that her termination was arbitrary and
capricious and an abuse of discretion. She also asserted that the termination
violated both the San Antonio city charter and the civil service rules. She
further contended that she was denied her right to due process: the case,
according to the employee, was not in the nature of a judicial review of an
administrative decision, but rather was a suit for the violation of the em-
ployee's state and federal constitutional rights to due process, liberty, and
free speech. The court disagreed with the employee's characterization of the
case and found that the suit was a request for judicial review of the termina-
tion and a request for reinstatement and back pay. 28 7 The right to appeal
from an action of either an administrative party or an appeals board only
exists when expressly provided for by statute or ordinance, or when the ad-
ministrative action in question violates a constitutional right or deprives a
complainant of a vested property right.288 No provisions in the civil service
rules or the city charter required judicial review of the city manager's deci-
sion to terminate a classified civil employee. The court found, however, that
the employee had a vested property right in her job.289 Since she was de-
prived of a vested property right by administrative action, the court found
that she had a right to judicial review. 290 The substantial evidence rule,
however, governs judicial review of administrative actions, and the court
found that substantial evidence existed to uphold the city manager's decision
to terminate the employment.291
In City of Brownsville v. Pena292 Pena brought suit against the city of
Brownsville and Ernesto Avalos for libel and violation of the Whistle Blower
Act.29 3 The court found that Avalos, Pena's supervisor, was engaged in city
business when he suspended and demoted Pena for reporting a violation of
law by Avalos and an operations manager. 294 Avalos's actions supported
the city's liability under the Whistle Blower Act, which prohibits retaliation
or discrimination against public employees who report violations of the law.
The city did not preserve its sovereign immunity defense because it failed to
plead the defense, submit issues on it, or raise it in a motion for judgment
notwithstanding verdict.
The court further found that since Pena had brought an action for being
suspended and demoted in violation of the Whistle Blower Act and a sepa-
rate libel action for comment disseminated by Avalos, that two distinct inju-
discourtesy ... to the public or to fellow employees.., and conduct prejudicial to good order
.... 1 Id.





292. 716 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
293. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a (Vernon Supp. 1987).
294. 716 S.W.2d at 680.
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ries were alleged, and Pena could recover damages for both complaints. 295
Additionally, the court found that defamatory statements made by Avalos
were made with malice and made within the scope of employment.296 This
finding justified holding the city liable for exemplary damages under the
Whistle Blower Act.297
In Corpus Christi Independent School District v. Padilla298 two noncon-
tractual employees brought suit against the Corpus Christi Independent
School District. They alleged that the district had deprived them of their
constitutional and statutory rights by refusing their request for a hearing
before the board of trustees concerning their superintendent's denial of their
employment grievances. The court noted that fourteenth amendment due
process requirements were not an issue in this case because the case did not
involve an interest encompassed by the fourteenth amendment's protection
of liberty and property.299 The court found that the employees had no lib-
erty or property interest in bus routes, work schedules, or even in their con-
tinued employment, which were the subjects of the grievances. 300 The court
also found that an open forum existed whereby anyone, whether a member
of the general public or an employee of the district, could address the board.
Thus, the court found no denial of equal protection. 30 1
City of Houston v. Houston Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council30 2 was an appeal by the city of Houston from a temporary injunc-
tion that prohibited it from enforcing an ordinance that set minimum wage
rates for workers in public works projects. 30 3 Both parties agreed that the
city's authority to set prevailing wage rates arose under article 5159a.304
The court held that the city's determination of general prevailing per diem
wages in accordance with state law was final and not subject to judicial
review.305
295. Id. at 681.
296. Id. at 683.
297. Id.
298. 709 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
299. Id. at 703.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 705.
302. 710 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
303. Prior to adoption of the ordinance Houston Gulf Coast Building & Construction
Trades Council obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting the city of Houston from adopting
the ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its author-
ity when it predetermined the validity of the proposed legislative action. City of Houston v.
Houston Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 697 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). In reversing, the court did not address the validity
of the ordinance, its reviewability once enacted, or its effect on those employed at city con-
struction projects.
304. 710 S.W.2d at 183; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5159a (Vernon 1971). Article
5159a was enacted in 1933 to ensure that workers on public projects receive a salary equal to
or greater than the prevailing wage rate. The statute, therefore, requires the public body
awarding contracts for public work to determine prevailing wage rates for each craft needed
for the work and to disclose this rate in bid calls. 710 S.W.2d at 183.
305. 710 S.W.2d at 184 (citing Texas Highway Comm'n v. El Paso Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 149 Tex. 457, 462, 234 S.W.2d 857, 860 (1950)). The court in El Paso Building stated
that neither the common law nor the constitutions of Texas or the United States provided a
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Heard v. Incalcaterra 306 involved the dismissal of a deputy sheriff for vio-
lating written departmental policies regarding alcohol use, violation of laws,
general behavior, and disorderly conduct. 30 7 Pursuant to article 2372h-8,
section 7,308 the dismissed deputy appealed his termination to the civil ser-
vice commission, which upheld the termination. The deputy then appealed
the commission's order to district court, which rendered judgment for the
deputy.
The court of appeals considered the issue of whether the substantial evi-
dence rule applied at the district court level because the commission's order
decided issues that were judicial in nature rather than administrative; thus,
the court considered whether the trial de novo, required under article 2372h-
8, had to be a trial on the merits without regard to the substantial evidence
rule.309 The court recognized that no decisions interpreted article 2372h-8,
but the court found considerable authority interpreting trial de novo pursu-
ant to another statute, article 1269m, 310 that regulated municipal police and
fire fighter civil service.31' The court noted that decisions interpreted article
1269m to require a review using the substantial evidence rule.312 Thus, the
court permitted the introduction of evidence at the trial de novo for the trial
court to determine whether substantial evidence existed that reasonably sup-
ported the commission's order. 313
In McLeod v. City of San Antonio314 the San Antonio city council abol-
ished a position in the city fire department and created a new civilian posi-
tion to replace the old position. The fireman in line to fill the old position
sued the city, claiming that the city had not acted in good faith.315 The city
was required to show that it had acted in good faith and in the best interests
of the city in terminating an unnecessary position. 316 The court held that
right to receive the prevailing wage rate. 149 Tex. at 462, 234 S.W.2d at 860. State statute
gives the right and governs it. Id.
306. 702 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
307. Captain Dan Doehring of the Harris County Sheriff's Department observed the plain-
tiff driving approximately 90 miles per hour. Doehring attempted to stop the plaintiff but he
failed to do so. Doehring then radioed for assistance. Officer McDuffey responded, pulled
behind the plaintiff, and turned on his police lights. The plaintiff stopped his car, but refused
to take either a breath test or blood test. The plaintiff did agree, however, to take a videotaped
motor skills test. Within approximately three hours after his arrest the plaintiff received notice
of his termination for violating written departmental policies.
308. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2372h-8, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
309. 702 S.W.2d at 275.
310. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (Vernon Supp. 1987).
311. 702 S.W.2d at 275.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. 702 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
315. One of two persons who had been employed in the old position received a promotion;
thus, a vacancy was created that the plaintiff most likely would have filled had not the city
abolished the position. Id. at 280.
316. Id.; see Burkhart v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no
writ). The court in McLeod held that to determine the necessity of an abolished position the
question of whether the duties of the position were reassigned must be considered. 702 S.W.2d
at 281. The court, however, stated that in this case the reassignment of the duties of the old,




the city met its burden and held that a city may legally abolish a municipal
position if the city acts in good faith and through a valid ordinance. 317
White v. Commissioners Court318 involved the issue of determining the
reasonableness of salaries for justices of the peace. White, a justice of the
peace in Kimbell County, Texas, drew a salary of only one dollar per year,
and he received no compensation for office expenses despite that a justice of
the peace in a neighboring precinct earned $1,208 per month plus benefits
and expenses. The court refused to intrude on the discretion of the commis-
sioners court with respect to the amount that would constitute a reasonable
salary, but the court found that the commissioners had a legal duty to com-
pensate White with a reasonable salary. 319
White also alleged a violation of the Civil Rights Act.320 The court found
no support in the record for this complaint. 321 Since this argument failed,
and because White could not establish any other basis for the recovery of
attorney's fees, the court denied recovery. 322
Vondy v. Commissioners Court 323 involved an appeal from an order dis-
charging the commissioners court of Uvalde County from a writ of manda-
mus on the grounds that the commissioners had complied with the writ.
Vondy, a constable for Uvalde County, Texas, filed an application for writ of
mandamus six months after his election to compel the commissioners court
to pay him a reasonable salary. The trial court issued the writ, but only after
the Texas Supreme Court instructed it to do so. 324 In accordance with the
writ, the commissioners court set a salary of forty dollars per month. Over
Vondy's objection, the trial court discharged the commissioners from the
writ and also denied a motion for contempt filed by Vondy against the com-
missioners. On appeal, Vondy argued that a salary of forty dollars per
month was not reasonable and that in addition to a reasonable salary, the
commissioners should compensate him for office expenses. Vondy also ar-
gued that the trial court incorrectly refused his claim for interest on unpaid
salary due him.
The court of appeals pointed out that the legislature had yet to provide
parties an indication of the proper method to appeal to a district court from
a ruling of the commissioners court or the proper method for invoking the
district court's supervision. 325 The court recognized, however, that accord-
ing to prior case law a district court may overturn a decision of the commis-
sioners court when the district court perceives a clear abuse of discretion. 326
Vondy properly invoked the district court's jurisdiction in claiming that the
317. 702 S.W.2d at 281.
318. 705 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
319. Id. at 326.
320. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
321. 705 S.W.2d at 326.
322. Id.
323. 714 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
324. See Vondy v. Commissioners Court, 620 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Tex. 1981) (Texas Consti-
tution requires a reasonable salary for constables).




commissioners denied him a reasonable salary; such a claim necessarily al-
leges that the commissioners abused their discretion.3 27
After finding the jurisdiction of the district court proper, the court of ap-
peals turned to the issue of the reasonableness of the salary. The court found
as a matter of law that based on the duties and time required of Vondy, the
commissioners set Vondy's salary unreasonably low. 328 The court, however,
still refused to set the salary and, instead, remanded the case to the district
court with instructions that the district court not discharge the writ of man-
damus until the commissioners court could set a reasonable salary. 329
X. TAX
The case of City of El Paso v. El Paso Community College District 330 con-
cerned a constitutional challenge to the Tax Increment Financing Act.331
The El Paso City Council had passed an ordinance, relying on the Tax In-
crement Financing Act, designating El Paso's central business district as a
reinvestment zone. Under the Act the city could finance the development of
the area with bonds that the city would repay with an increase in ad valorem
tax revenues. The school district attacked the constitutionality of the Act as
it applied to them through operation of the ordinance. 332 The school district
claimed that the Act violated article VII, section 3 of the Texas Constitu-
tion 333 by allowing the city to apply school district taxes toward noneduca-
tional purposes and to levy those taxes without the consent of the school
district's board of trustees. The school district also argued that school and
community college districts do not fall within the meaning of political subdi-
vision as used in article VIII, section 1-g(b) of the Texas Constitution 334 and,
therefore, are not subject to any tax increment financing. The court of ap-
peals found the Tax Increment Financing Act unconstitutional as applied to
school and community college districts on the grounds that such districts
were not political subdivisions within the meaning of the Act and that school
funds could not be used for noneducational purposes. 335 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed and upheld the authority of cities to include school
327. Id.
328. Id. at 421.
329. Id. at 423. The court of appeals reminded the commissioners court that TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3912i, §§ 1, 2 (Vernon 1966) provide some maximum salary figures
based on population. 714 S.W.2d at 422.
330. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 541 (July 16, 1986).
331. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1066e (Vernon Supp. 1987). The legislature created
tax increment financing to ease a city's financial burden with respect to improving underdevel-
oped areas. Under id. if a municipality designates an area as a reinvestment zone, the city may
apply any increase in ad valorem tax revenues from the zone toward either the purchase and
improvement of property in the zone or the redemption of bonds issued by the city to finance
the approved projects.
332. Id.
333. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
334. Id. art. VIII, § l-g(b) (1876, amended 1981). To ensure the constitutionality of the
Tax Increment Financing Act the legislature proposed an enabling amendment to the constitu-
tion entitled "Development or Redevelopment of Property; Ad Valorem Tax Relief and Issu-
ance of Bonds and Notes." Id. § 1-g. Texas adopted this amendment by popular vote in 198 1.
335. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 542.
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districts and community college districts in reinvestment zones created pur-
suant to the Act. 336 The supreme court based its finding upon a determina-
tion that the legislature intended school districts and community college
districts to fall within the Act's definition of political subdivisions. 337
In Wilson v. Galveston County Central Appraisal District 3 38 Chuck Wil-
son, the tax assessor-collector of Galveston County, challenged the constitu-
tionality of a provision of the Texas Tax Code that gave an appraisal district
final authority over the property appraisal process. 339 Wilson argued that
the Texas Constitution vested this authority only in the county tax assessor-
collector. 34° The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the challenged
provision, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.341 The
supreme court held that article VIII, section 18(b) of the Texas Constitu-
tion 342 and the codification of its intent in the Tax Code343 mandated a sin-
gle appraisal district within each county. 3 4 The legislature created
appraisal districts as political subdivisions of the state that are responsible
for appraising property within the district.345 The Tax Code clearly confines
the selection and tenure of the officer charged with carrying out the appraisal
process to the discretion of the appraisal district board of directors.3 46 The
court found that the appraisal district's discretion with respect to the matter
was not limited by any constitutional provision. 347
In Valero Transmission Co. v. Hays Consolidated Independent School Dis-
trict 348 a taxpayer company alleged that the taxes claimed by a school dis-
trict were invalid because they were based upon an improper valuation of the
company's property. The court found that administrative review by an ap-
praisal review board and appeal of appraisal board decisions to a district
336. Id. at 543.
337. Id.
338. 713 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1986).
339. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.01 (Vernon 1982).
340. The office of county tax assessor-collector is established by TEX. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 14, which requires the collector to "perform all the duties with respect to assessing property
for the purpose of taxation and of collecting taxes, as may be prescribed by the Legislature."
341. 713 S.W.2d at 101.
342. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 18(b) (1876, amended 1980).
343. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.01 (Vernon 1982).
344. 713 S.W.2d at 101.
345. Id.; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.01 (Vernon 1982).
346. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.05(b), (c) (Vernon 1982). This provision provides two
alternative methods that an appraisal district may choose to obtain a single districtwide ap-
praisal of property. The district may either appoint a chief appraiser to perform the appraisal
procedure or it may enter into a contract with one of the taxing units already operating in the
district to perform the countywide appraisal. Id. In the latter case the head of the taxing unit
serves as chief appraiser. Galveston County initially chose the latter method with Wilson
serving as chief appraiser. The county then decided to dissolve the contract and proceed under
the first alternative. Wilson then sued.
347. 713 S.W.2d at 101. Justices Kilgarlin and Ray dissented. Id. at 101-02. They argued
that the constitutional provisions, when read together, required a single appraisal within each
county to be performed by the tax assessor-collector of that county. Id. They questioned
whether the amendment to TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 18 was intended to allow "the people's
duly elected tax assessor and collector ... [to] be substituted by appraisal boards insulated
from public scrutiny." 713 S.W.2d at 101.
348. 704 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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court constituted a property owner's exclusive remedies when challenging
property valuations or other aspects of the ad valorem tax.349 The court also
found that a taxing unit may impose a valid tax even though a taxpayer's
protests are pending before the appraisal review board.350
In Dallas County Appraisal District v. L. D. Brinkman & Co. 3 5 1 the Dallas
court of appeals held that "goods are located in the state for longer than a
temporary period if, under federal law, they are in the state on more than a
transitory basis." If the owner halts transit of the goods not because of an
unavoidable delay or to accommodate transportation needs, but to serve the
business interests of the company, the goods' "continuity of transit" is inter-
rupted for tax purposes, and the state where the goods are located may tax
the goods. 352
Central Appraisal District v. Pecan Valley Facilities, Inc.353 involved a non-
profit corporation, Pecan Valley, that operated primarily by purchasing land
and buildings and then leasing them to a charitable corporation. 354 The
court held that section 11.18 of the Texas Tax Code355 "does not exempt
from taxation an organization which merely 'assists' a charitable organiza-
tion in carrying out its charitable 'purposes.' "356 An organization may
qualify for tax exemption under section 11.18 only if the organization is
formed exclusively for charitable purposes and the organization exclusively
performs charitable functions. 357 The court further reasoned that Pecan
Valley could not claim tax exemption under article XI, section 9 of the
Texas Constitution 358 because Pecan Valley merely leased property to a
charity that held the property for purposes other than the exclusive use and
enjoyment of the public. 359
In City of Dallas v. Union Tower Corp.36° Union Tower challenged the
property tax assessed by the city and school district. The district court
found for Union Tower, and the court of appeals affirmed. 361 The court
based its decision on evidence that the city and school district assessed
349. Id. at 862.
350. Id. at 863-64.
351. 701 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
352. Id.; see General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 230 (1908). In Brinkman the court
found that Brinkman's goods were within Texas's taxing jurisdiction because, based on prior
case law, the goods were not in transit. 701 S.W.2d at 20 (citing General Oil, 209 U.S. at 230).
Brinkman had its goods in a warehouse with 10% of the goods already sold to out-of-state
customers and the remainder subject to both in-state and out-of-state sale.
353. 704 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
354. Because the charitable corporation, Pecan Valley Mental Health-Mental Retardation
Region, could not legally buy land on credit, Pecan Valley Facilities, Inc. was created as a
nonprofit corporation for the single purpose of obtaining property for the region to use for
housing.
355. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18 (Vernon 1982).
356. 704 S.W.2d at 89.
357. Id. at 88.
358. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 9 (property held for public purpose not subject to taxation or
forced sale).
359. 704 S.W.2d at 90.
360. 703 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
361. Id. at 283.
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Union Tower's property at ninety percent of its actual value, but assessed
property of other taxpayers at an average of sixty-four percent of actual
value.362 This variance in the level of assessment demonstrated unequal tax-
ation and required a decision in favor of Union Tower.363
In Grand Prairie Hospital Authority v. Tarrant County Appraisal Dis-
trict364 the Grand Prairie Hospital Authority claimed tax exemption for a
certain medical office building, arguing that the law affords a hospital tax-
exempt status without the necessity of any legal or administrative proceed-
ings. 365 The Tax Code affords tax exempt status to hospital property only if
the hospital holds the property for a public purpose.366 Because the hospital
allowed private doctors to lease part of the building for the doctors' own
businesses, the court refused to give the building tax-exempt status.367 Con-
sequently, the hospital could obtain tax-exempt status for its building only
through administrative action, and the hospital could not obtain judicial re-
view before the administrative remedies were exhausted. 368 The court also
noted that the Declaratory Judgment Act 369 is not a vehicle to avoid the
provisions of the Tax Code regarding administrative process. 370
Coastal States Petroleum Co. v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dis-
trict371 considered the question of how a taxing authority should value a
refiner's crude oil inventory for tax purposes.372 The court reasoned that
valuations made by boards of equalization were quasi-judicial and presumed
by statute to be final. 373 A court may not set aside those valuations without
a compelling reason. 374 Before a court may overturn a decision of a board,
the court must find that the assessed value grossly exceeded fair market
value, thereby injuring the taxpayer. 375 The degree of excessiveness must be
so great "as to shock a correct mind and thereby raise a presumption that
362. Id. at 280.
363. Id. at 283.
364. 707 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
365. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.45 (Vernon 1982) ordinarily requires such proceedings.
366. See id. § 11.1 (a). The Texas Constitution has a similar provision. TEX. CONST. art.
XI, § 9.
367. 707 S.W.2d at 284.
368. Id.
369. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001-.011 (Vernon 1986) (court may de-
termine rights of competing parties before either party has damaged the other).
370. 707 S.W.2d at 284; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 11.01-.45 (Vernon 1982).
371. 707 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
372. The oil company contended that book value provided the proper valuation measure-
ment for a barrel of crude oil in storage. The company valued oil in storage on January 1,
1980, at $15.64 per barrel and at $15.65 per barrel on January 1, 1981. The school district, on
the other hand, used comparable market value to value the crude oil at $21.00 per barrel for
1980 and $28.00 per barrel for 1981.
373. 707 S.W.2d at 210.
374. Id.
375. Id. The court relied on language in Pierce v. City of Jacksonville, 403 S.W.2d 512
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Pierce the court found that although the
assessed property values exceeded property values as found by the jury, the excess was not
great enough to give rise to a presumption that the board of equalization acted fraudulently in
its assessment. See id. at 516-17.
1987]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the valuation was fraudulent. '3 76
In Coastal the oil company could not show the court that it suffered a
substantial injury because of the assessment.3 77 The company also failed to
persuade the court that the degree of excessiveness of the assessment was
such that the court should set the assessment aside.378 The court found that
the book value only approximated the true value of the crude, and in cases in
which a disparity exists between book value and market value, book value is
not necessarily the proper valuation measure. 379
In Youth Camps, Inc. v. Comfort Independent School District 380 the San
Antonio court of appeals considered whether certain property held by a
youth development association should receive an exemption from taxation.
The jury found for the youth camp, but the district court granted the school
district's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court of ap-
peals reversed, finding sufficient support for the jury's finding that the youth
camp operated as a religious, educational and physical development associa-
tion during the tax years in question.3 81 The school district thus should not
have levied a tax on the property for those years. 382 The court also found,
however, that the youth camp had failed to comply with statutory provisions
that require organizations seeking an exemption under section 11.19(d)(4) of
the Texas Tax Code383 to, "by charter, bylaw, or other regulation.., pledge
its assets for use in performing the association's youth development func-
tions ... .,"384 The youth camp produced no evidence to support its conten-
tion that it had complied with the statute during 1980 and 1981.385
Consequently, the youth camp had to pay taxes due on its property for those
two years.386
In Dallas County Appraisal District v. Lal 387 the plaintiff, Lal, alleged that
the Dallas County Appraisal District had overvalued his property for pur-
poses of assessing ad valorem taxes. Lal argued that the valuation violated
article VIII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution.38 8 The appraisal district
376. 707 S.W.2d at 210 (quoting Pierce v. City of Jacksonville, 403 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
377. Id. at 212.
378. Id. at 213.
379. Id. at 212. The court stated:
[W]hen suit is brought to collect taxes, the fact that the taxing authorities have
arbitrarily disregarded the true and legal basis of arriving at assessed valuation,
does not, of itself, entitle a litigating taxpayer to relief. He must establish the
actual market value of his property in order to show that the arbitrary or unlaw-
ful plan or scheme of arriving at assessed valuation resulted in substantial injury
to him.
Id.
380. 705 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
381. Id. at 338-39.
382. Id. at 339.
383. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § ll.19(d)(4) (Vernon 1982).
384. 705 S.W.2d at 339 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.19(d)(4)(A) (Vernon 1982)).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. 701 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
388. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
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moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction
because Lal had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking ju-
dicial relief. The trial judge granted a partial summary judgment because
Lal had not complied with the Tax Code requirement that a taxpayer must
first protest assessments before the appraisal district review board before
seeking judicial relief.389 The trial court then found, however, that the dis-
trict grossly overestimated the value of Lal's property, and the court reduced
the value. The court of appeals reversed on the basis that allowing Lal to
bring his action without first seeking the administrative remedies provided
by the Code abrogated the Code's purpose of avoiding judicial action.3 90
Taxpayers in Davis v. Duncanville Independent School District 391 sued the
school district to enjoin the district from constructing an indoor swimming
pool. The district court entered judgment in favor of the district, and the
taxpayers appealed. The taxpayers argued that statements and representa-
tions made by the district superintendent should bind the district. The su-
perintendent had stated in public speaking engagements and in publicly
distributed leaflets that the district would utilize certain bonds issued by the
district solely to build new schools to accommodate student population
growth. That growth, however, did not occur. The taxpayers also asserted
that the school board acted illegally in using the bonds in question to build a
swimming pool when the bond proposition approved by the voters indicated
that the bonds were to enable the district to build new buildings.
The court of appeals held that the legislature had conferred the power to
govern the district exclusively upon the board of trustees of the district and
that, since the district was a political subdivision of the state, the school
board could only act at a properly called meeting. 392 Consequently, state-
ments and representations of the superintendent made outside of a properly
called board meeting and not adopted by the board could not bind the school
board.393
On the issue of whether the school board acted legally in approving the
use of the bonds for a swimming pool, the court of appeals upheld the find-
ing of the trial court that the school district acted legally. 394 The trial court
found that an indoor pool fell within the definition of a school building.
Given the finding that the pool constituted a type of building contemplated
under the bond proposition, the school district could proceed with the con-
struction of the pool. 39 5
The appellants in Corpus Christi Taxpayers Association v. City of Corpus
389. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. chs. 41, 42 (Vernon 1982).
390. 701 S.W.2d at 47. The procedures provided in the Tax Code "are the exclusive means
by which a property owner may challenge the valuation of his property by an appraisal dis-
trict." Id. at 46. The court held that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies demands that if
the legislature has provided administrative remedies for use in protecting administrative
agency actions, the remedies must be exhausted before resorting to judicial review. Id.
391. 701 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ dism'd).
392. Id. at 17.
393. Id.




Christi396 challenged the effective tax rate for 1984 as set by the city. The
appellants also assailed the constitutionality of chapter 26 of the Tax
Code397 on grounds of vagueness, alleging that the statute failed to specify
the method of rate calculation a taxing entity should follow. The court of
appeals held that before a city can arrive at a valid tax rate, the city must
comply with the calculation procedures contained in the tax statutes.398
Courts do not demand absolute compliance, but cities must substantially
comply for the rate to be valid. 399 The court found that the city had com-
plied with the statute.4oo As to the issue of constitutionality, the court found
that the appellants did not present any grounds to rebut the presumption
that the legislature had not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily.40 1
In Salvaggio v. Houston Independent School District402 two classes of tax-
payers brought class action suits. The actions centered on section 33.07 of
the Tax Code,4° 3 which allows a taxing unit or appraisal district to charge
penalties on delinquent taxes. Section 33.07 became effective on January 1,
1982, but the school district in this case had attached penalties to delinquent
taxes prior to that date. The trial court, relying on the voluntary payment
rule, refused to certify the class of taxpayer who had paid the penalty and
now sought relief. According to the voluntary payment rule, a taxpayer may
not recover taxes paid voluntarily even if the tax was illegal. 404 The applica-
tion of the rule requires a court to determine the voluntariness of each indi-
vidual payment; the trial court, therefore, found a class action to be
improper.405 The court of appeals agreed with this analysis, holding that
class certification is a decision within the discretion of the trial court.4° 6 If,
as in this case, no clear abuse of discretion is evident, the court of appeals
must affirm the decision.40 7
XI. ANTITRUST
During the survey period two cases of significance were decided regarding
antitrust. In a Fifth Circuit case, Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc.,4° plain-
tiff taxicab drivers charged that the board of the Dallas-Fort Worth Re-
gional Airport violated the Sherman Antitrust Act 4° 9 by awarding the
396. 716 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
397. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 26.00-.15 (Vernon 1982) (assessment of property taxes).
398. 716 S.W.2d at 580 (citing Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Dickinson, 641 S.W.2d
302, 306 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
399. Id.
400. Id. at 581.
401. Id. at 581-82.
402. 709 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ dism'd).
403. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.07 (Vernon 1982).
404. 709 S.W.2d at 308. The court noted three exceptions to the rule: (1) fraud; (2) ex-





408. 801 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1986).
409. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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outbound taxicab market at the airport to Surtran Taxicabs to the exclusion
of all other taxicab companies. The Fifth Circuit relied upon the opinion of
the district court in the case to affirm the district court's judgment.410 In
light of recent antitrust developments, especially the passage of the Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984,411 the court addressed three dispositive
issues in the case.
The court first discussed the state action exemption that exempts govern-
mental entities from the requirements of the Sherman Antitrust Act when-
ever an entity acts "pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed... state policy that was actively supervised by the State. '412 The
court noted that the Supreme Court held in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire413 that the requirement that the state actively supervise the policy
should not apply when the acting governmental entity is a municipality.414
The Fifth Circuit then turned to the question of whether or not the airport
board operated as a municipality within the meaning of the state action ex-
emption, and if so, whether the board had acted in furtherance of a clear
state policy.
The court held that joint management of the airport by the cities of Dallas
and Fort Worth through the airport board did not necessarily mean that the
airport board could not operate as a municipality within the meaning of the
state action exemption.41 5 The court concluded that the airport board fell
within the definition of municipality.416 Furthermore, granting an exclusive
pickup right to a cab operator required the exercise of airport management
authority expressly conferred upon municipalities by the state.417 The state
gave the authority to municipalities pursuant to the state policy of granting
municipalities power to manage and operate airports; hence, the state action
exemption applied.418 The court found further evidence of the state policy to
abdicate airport management to municipalities in legislation passed in 1983
that expressly gave joint airport boards power to regulate airport taxicab
service.419
The court then considered whether section 3 of the Local Government
Antitrust Act 420 insulated the joint airport board from the claims made by
the plaintiffs under section 4 of the Clayton Act.421 The Local Government
410. 801 F.2d at 159. The court attached the district court's opinion as Appendix A to the
order affirming the district court's judgment.
411. 15 U.S.C. § 35 (Supp. I 1985); see infra note 422 and accompanying text.
412. 801 F.2d at 161 (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38
(1985)).
413. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
414. 801 F.2d at 161.
415. Id. at 162.
416. Id. One court based its determination, in part, on specific language of the Municipal
Airport Act, which defines joint operators of airports as public agencies and public agencies as
municipalities. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d-14, § 14 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
417. 801 F.2d at 162.
418. Id. at 162-63.
419. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46d-14(d)(6), (7) (Vernon Supp. 1987)).
420. 15 U.S.C. § 35 (Supp. 11 1985).
421. Id. §§ 15(a)-(c) (1982).
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Antitrust Act would have specifically mandated the dismissal of the plain-
tiffs' claims except that the plaintiffs commenced their action prior to the
Act's effective date.422 A court could, however, apply the Local Govern-
ment Antitrust Act retroactively, if the local government involved could per-
suade the court that not doing so would result in unfairness.423 A court may
consider several factors in reaching this decision, among them: (1) the stage
to which the action has progressed; (2) whether the plaintiff can obtain other
relief under the Clayton Act; (3) whether the governmental entity was
within its authority when it took the action under scrutiny; (4) the extent of
financial difficulty that a treble damage award could impose on the entity;
and (5) whether the entity acted in accordance with a state or federal law or
policy. 424 The court considered the factors and decided to apply the Act
retroactively. 425 First, at the time of the passage of the Local Government
Antitrust Act the case had not advanced past the discovery stage, and the
parties still had major discovery ahead. Second, the plaintiffs could seek
relief under sections other than section 4 of the Clayton Act or could pro-
ceed against private parties426 and possibly obtain an adequate remedy.
Third, as the court determined earlier, the municipality acted in furtherance
of a state policy and within the limits of the law. Finally, although the
twenty-one million dollars in damages sought by the plaintiffs would not
place an impossible financial burden on the two cities, it certainly would
have a substantial adverse effect. The court accordingly dismissed the Clay-
ton Act claims. 427
The final issue the court considered involved the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine428 and whether it insulated the private defendants in the case from anti-
trust claims. This doctrine allows private entities to persuade public officials
to take action that may harm competition. 429 If the attempt to influence the
officials is not merely a sham hiding an actual attempt to injure the business
of a competitor, then the action is protected from antitrust liability.430 The
court concluded that the actions of the private defendants, Surtran, Yellow
Cab, and Fort Worth Cab, were not a sham, but were substantially moti-
vated by a desire to secure a particular government action: operation of the
airport cab service under the single-operator concept. 431 Thus, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine protected the private defendants, and the court awarded
422. Id. § 35(a) (Supp. I 1985) provides: "[n]o damages, interest on damages, costs, or
attorney's fees may be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15,
15a, or 15c) from any local government .... "
423. 801 F.2d at 165; see H.R. REP. No. 1158, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2113 (1984).
424. 801 F.2d at 165-66.
425. Id. at 167-68.
426. Private party defendants were Surtran Taxicabs, Yellow Cab Co. of Dallas, and Fort
Worth Cab and Baggage Co. The latter two had joined to form Surtran for purposes of operat-
ing at the airport.
427. Id. at 167-68.
428. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presi-
dent's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
429. 801 F.2d at 168.
430. Id.




In Central Ambulance Service, Inc. v. City of Dallas433 the plaintiffs as-
serted that the method of operation of the Dallas ambulance service violated
the Sherman Antitrust Act.434 Pursuant to a Dallas city ordinance, the Dal-
las fire department handled all emergency services within the city limits. 435
Private ambulance companies were permitted to provide only non-emer-
gency services. The plaintiff, a private ambulance service, argued that this
restriction, along with the city's utilization of a single emergency telephone
number directed only to the city, prevented the plaintiff from competing
against the city for emergency service calls.
The federal district court in Central Ambulance applied a doctrine formu-
lated in Parker v. Brown.436 The Parker doctrine operates to protect state
action from antitrust claims if the governmental entity in question has been
expressly authorized by a state to act in a particular manner pursuant to an
express state policy. 437 To protect the challenged ambulance service's
method of operation with the Parker doctrine, the city had to show that the
state policy acted to reduce competition in ambulance services and that the
antitrust claim naturally resulted from the city's attempt to implement that
policy. 438 The Parker protection did not automatically extend to Dallas sim-
ply because Dallas, as a municipality, received its power directly from the
state as a home rule city.439 The court found, however, that the Emergency
Medical Service Act440 and the Emergency Communication District Act441
bestowed broad discretionary power in cities so that the cities could provide
its citizens with the most efficient and effective service." 2 Additionally, the
court found that the challenged activity reasonably resulted from the city's
attempt to promote the state goal of providing the best emergency service." 3
The Parker doctrine, therefore, barred any antitrust claim based on Dallas's
method of operating its emergency medical service. 4"
XII. MISCELLANEOUS GOVERNMENTAL CASES
In Kaplan v. Clearlake City Water Authority445 the plaintiff, Kaplan, al-
leged that the defendants, acting in concert, denied water and sewer service
to Kaplan's property in order to prevent him from building multifamily
housing units. Kaplan asserted that the defendants' actions violated Texas
432. Id.
433. 631 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
434. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
435. DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE §§ 15D-1 to -9 (1960).
436. 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
437. 631 F. Supp. at 368.
438. Id. at 369-70.
439. Id. at 369.
440. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4447o, 4447o-1 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
441. Id. art. 1432d.
442. 631 F. Supp. at 369-71.
443. Id. at 370.
444. Id. at 370-71.
445. 794 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1986).
19871
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
law, federal antitrust and civil rights laws, as well as the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. 446 The Fifth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for the de-
fendants, 447 finding that the district court properly applied the Local Gov-
ernment Antitrust Act44 8 and barred Kaplan's antitrust claims.449 Relying
on Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc.4 50 the Kaplan court found that the par-
ties had not yet completed pretrial discovery when the defendants, relying on
the Local Government Antitrust Act, moved to dismiss.45' When parties
have been in the midst of discovery at the time the Local Government Anti-
trust Act went into effect, courts generally have applied the Act even though
the suit was filed prior to the Act's effective date.4 52 Also, Kaplan could
pursue remedies under the Clayton Act other than those barred by the Local
Government Antitrust Act.453 A final factor that indicated the propriety of
applying the Local Government Antitrust Act to ban Kaplan's antitrust
claims was that, although Kaplan filed suit prior to the Act's effective date,
Kaplan failed to make his antitrust claims at that time even though he was
aware that a factual basis for those claims existed.454 Kaplan added the
antitrust claims by an amended petition filed six months after the Act went
into effect.455
Concerning the substantive due process and equal protection claims the
court found that Kaplan had not been denied due process. Kaplan asserted
that under Texas law he possessed a property right entitling him to as much
utility service as he requested. In a footnote the court emphasized that
"Kaplan claimed much more than a right to service; he claim[ed] a right to
as much service as he desire[d]. '' 456 The court, however, did not have to
decide the difficult question of whether Kaplan possessed such an extensive
right.457 Instead, the court relied upon its decision in Shelton v. College Sta-
tion 458 to dispose of Kaplan's substantive due process claims. According to
Shelton, when reviewing a decision of an entity possessing legislative or
quasi-legislative authority, a federal court should intervene only if the en-
tity's decision is not based upon any legitimate reason. 459 Shelton thus could
have limited the water authority's exercise of discretion in allocating its ser-
446. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
447. 794 F.2d at 1066.
448. 15 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1982).
449. 794 F.2d at 1063.
450. 801 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1567, 94 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1987);
see supra notes 408-32 and accompanying text.
451. 794 F.2d at 1063.
452. Id.
453. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 424. Kaplan, under the Clayton Act, possibly
could have obtained an injunction to prevent the water authority from denying him service.
794 F.2d at 1062-63.




458. 780 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 89, 93 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1986).
459. 794 F.2d at 1064.
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vice. 460 The water authority, however, presented the court with two plausi-
ble reasons for denying service to Kaplan. First, the water authority had
limited capacity, and thus, it had imposed a moratorium on multifamily
housing service. Second, service that might have been provided by a newly
constructed sewage facility was limited by the terms of an Environmental
Protection Agency grant that had been used to build the new facility. The
Fifth Circuit, therefore, held that since the issue of legitimacy was open to
argument Kaplan's due process rights were not violated.461
The court then dispensed with Kaplan's equal protection claim by relying
on Stern v. Tarrant County Hospital District.462 According to the Fifth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Stern, a court should uphold a water authority's distinction,
for purposes of providing water service, between multifamily dwellings and
other customers, such as businesses and single-family residences, if the dis-
tinction is rational.463 The water authority stated that it continued to pro-
vide service to small users rather than large users because of a desire to
continue growth while remaining within capacity limits. The authority had
no moratorium on commercial users because the authority felt that this type
of user increased the authority's tax base without requiring a large amount
of service. Although the court found some flaws in the water authority's
reasoning, the court could not say that a rational decision-maker would
reach a different conclusion.464 Kaplan's equal protection claim thus
failed.465
In City of Arlington v. Byrd 466 the city of Arlington decided to widen a
two-lane road to a four-lane divided street. Before it passed the ordinance
the city determined that the changes would increase property values along
the roadway. Thus, the city felt justified in making special tax assessments
against owners of property along the roadway. The trial court determined
that the property owners received no special benefit as a result of the im-
provements. The city appealed.
Before the court of appeals reached the merits of the appeal it resolved
questions concerning the type of evidence that the trial court could properly
consider in determining the validity of the ordinance. The city argued that
the best evidence rule prohibited the trial court from considering any evi-
dence not before the city council at the hearing, in which the council found
that the property owners were specially benefitted by the improvements.
460. The discretion of the water authority was also limited by Clear Lake City Water Au-
thority Act, ch. 101, § 9, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 164, 174 (formerly codified at TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8280-280, § 9 (Vernon)), which provides that the water authority must act
according to a logical development plan, considering engineering limitations and economics.
Id. Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court held in Clear Lake City Water Authority v. Clear
Lake Utilities Co., 549 S.W.2d 385, 392 (Tex. 1977) that the authority must act in the best
interest of all users when deciding whether to provide services to an applicant.
461. 794 F.2d at 1064-65 (citing Shelton, 780 F.2d at 483).
462. 778 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1957, 90 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1986).
463. 778 F.2d at 1056.
464. 794 F.2d at 1065.
465. Id.
466. 713 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The court of appeals, however, followed the holding in City of Houston v.
Blackbird467 and held that a court could properly consider evidence of oc-
currences that took place after a city's determination if the evidence consti-
tutes the best evidence of what the city council should have known would
result from its determination. 468
Nevertheless, the court found no need to resort to an analysis of the actual
effect on property values to void the special assessment. Instead, the court
held that no substantial evidence was presented at the public hearings re-
garding the assessment to support a finding that the property owners would
receive a special benefit. 469 Documents demonstrated that the city based its
determination of special benefit upon speculation about future use of the
properties.470 The court stated, "[s]peculation about substantial benefit to
accrue to property owners in the indefinite future is not substantial evidence
to support a special assessment. '471 The court also held that the property
owners did not waive the right to complain of the finding of special benefit
simply because they failed to attend the public hearing regarding the assess-
ments and failed to present any evidence at the hearing.472 Additionally, the
court found that the assessment liens filed by the city violated the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,473 and therefore, the court
awarded costs and attorneys' fees.474
Cosby v. County Commissioners Court475 involved an appeal from a sum-
mary judgment in favor of the county commissioners of Randall County.
The plaintiff had filed suit to prevent the county from demolishing the
county's existing courthouse. The plaintiff argued that the county could not
destroy the facility without affording the citizens of the county an opportu-
nity to vote on the action. After noting that the Texas Constitution confers
broad powers upon the county commissioners to direct county business, 476
the court looked for any possible limits that Texas statutes might impose on
this power. The court noted that whatever limitations existed, the commis-
sioners still enjoyed broad discretion in carrying out legislative purposes.477
According to Texas statutes, the commissioners court was required to pro-
vide and maintain a courthouse for the county.478 The court, however, did
467. 394 S.W.2d 159, 164-65 (Tex. 1977).
468. 713 S.W.2d at 227.
469. Id. at 227-28.
470. Id. at 228. The special benefit to the adjoining land owners was based on an assump-
tion that the properties were presently unimproved real estate that would increase in value
when developed. Actually, however, each of the properties was improved single-family resi-
dential property. The city's appraiser, on the other hand, testified that the assessments were
based upon a projection that the properties would be changed from single-family residential
use to a densely developed residential use despite pre-existing single family residential zoning.
471. Id. (citing Page v. City of Lockhart, 397 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1965, no writ)).
472. Id.
473. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986 (1982).
474. 713 S.W.2d at 228-29.
475. 712 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
476. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 18.
477. 712 S.W.2d at 248.
478. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1603 (Vernon 1962) provides that a "county com-
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not agree with the plaintiff's argument that these statutes require the com-
missioners court to keep and maintain a particular courthouse forever, re-
gardless of any change of circumstances. 479 The court concluded that the
legislature intended to leave the final decision as to construction and repair
of courthouses to county commissioners discretion.480 The court found that
a logical extension of this discretion entails allowing the commissioners
court to decide if circumstances called for a new county courthouse.48 1
In Jackson County Vacuum Truck Service, Inc. v. Lavaca-Navidad River
Authority482 the Lavaca-Navidad River Authority (LNRA), a local govern-
ment agency in Jackson County, attempted to enter and inspect for water
pollution the premises on which Jackson County Vacuum Truck Service,
Inc. (Jackson) maintained its saltwater disposal operations. When employ-
ees of the vacuum service denied the LNRA access to the premises, the
LNRA brought suit asking the court to determine the inspection and en-
forcement rights of the LNRA. The trial court found that under the Water
Code local government agencies like the LNRA, along with the Texas De-
partment of Water Resources, could legally enter the vacuum service com-
pany's land for inspection purposes.48 3  The vacuum service company
appealed.
Jackson contended that because it maintained an injection well on the
premises to dispose of salt water produced during oil and gas drilling opera-
tions, only the Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC) could enter and in-
spect the land.48 4 The court disagreed, and found that the local government
agency, the Texas Department of Water Resources, and the RRC possessed
concurrent authority to inspect oil and gas lands.48 5 The court went further,
however, and stated that local governments and the Texas Department of
Water Resources were limited to entering and inspecting oil and gas land
and that once they discovered a violation they must defer to the RRC for
enforcement purposes.48 6
A taxicab driver appealed the suspension of his taxi driver's license by the
missioners court ... as soon as practicable ... shall provide a court house and jail for the
county, and offices for county officers at such county seat and keep the same in good repair."
Id. art. 2351 (Vernon 1971) provides that the commissioners court shall "[p]rovide and keep in
repair court houses, jails and all necessary public buildings."
479. 712 S.W.2d at 248.
480. Id. (citing McWilliams v. Commissioners' Court, 153 S.W. 368, 372 (rex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1913, no writ)).
481. Id.
482. 701 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd).
483. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-.307 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
484. The plaintiff relied on TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.131 (Vernon Pare. Supp. 1987),
which seems to contrast with other sections of the Water Code that grant a general inspection
power to local government agencies and the Texas Department of Water Resources. See id.
§§ 26.173(a), .014. Id. § 26.131 states that "[t]he Railroad Commission of Texas is solely
responsible for the control and disposition of waste and the abatement and prevention of pollu-
tion of ... water resulting from.., exploration, development, and production of oil or gas
485. 701 S.W.2d at 13.
486. Id. at 14.
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city of Dallas in Johnson v. City of Dallas.487 Johnson had applied to the city
for a license in March 1984. On the application he admitted to a prior con-
viction and subsequent parole for passing bad checks. Johnson failed to in-
clude, however, information about a conviction and subsequent parole for
theft. The city suspended Johnson's taxi license after discovering the theft
conviction. The city relied on section 45-3.2(a)(7) of the Dallas City
Code,488 which provides that to qualify for a taxi driver's license an appli-
cant must not have been convicted of a crime involving theft within five
years prior to the date of the application. Johnson contended that the city
could not suspend his taxi license on the basis of the theft conviction because
it was not directly related to his ability to operate a taxi cab. According to
article 6252-13c of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, conviction of any crime
may constitute proper grounds for the suspension of a license "if the crime
directly relates to the duties and responsibilities of the licensed occupa-
tion. ' 489 Because the city ordinance provided for suspension of a taxi license
without any consideration of the relationship between the crime and the du-
ties of the licensed position, the court found the ordinance inconsistent with
article 6252-13c. 490 The court also held that the city had not shown any
relationship between a theft conviction within five years before the applica-
tion date and the ability to operate a taxi.49 1 The court of appeals, therefore,
invalidated the ordinance, reversed the judgment of the trial court, and re-
manded the case. 492 The court chose not to reinstate Johnson's license be-
cause Johnson had not moved for summary judgment in the trial court.49 3
City of Dallas v. Smith 494 involved a suit for injunctive relief brought
against the city of Dallas, Gordon McDowell, a municipal court judge in
Dallas, and Richard Lewis, the director of court services for the city of Dal-
las. Smith, the owner of a bail bond service, contended that the Dallas mu-
nicipal courts entered civil judgments against him for money damages in bail
bond forfeitures because some of the people he bonded had not made their
court appearances. Smith alleged that the municipal courts lacked the au-
thority to enter such forfeiture judgments. The trial court agreed and per-
manently enjoined the city from prosecuting further forfeiture proceedings
in the municipal courts. The trial court, however, did not foreclose the city
from proceeding against any bond in a proper court. The court of appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court and dissolved the injunction on the
grounds that rendering a judgment in a bond forfeiture proceeding is merely
487. 702 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
488. DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE §§ 45-3.2(a)(7)(A)(vii), (B)(ii) (1985).
489. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
490. 702 S.W.2d at 292.
491. Id. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:
(b) In determining whether a criminal conviction directly relates to an occu-
pation, the licensing authority shall consider:
(4) the relationship of the crime to the ability, capacity, or fitness required to
perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities of a licensed occupation.
492. 702 S.W.2d at 293-94.
493. Id. at 294.
494. 716 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
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incidental to and part of a criminal case.495 A municipal court, therefore,
possesses jurisdiction to order forfeiture in cases in which the court has juris-
diction over the underlying criminal prosecution.4 96
In Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Wishnow497 the Texas Alco-
holic Beverage Commission revoked the liquor license of Wishnow. The
commission revoked the license upon finding, after an administrative hear-
ing, that Wishnow had violated the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code. Wish-
now or his employees apparently were intoxicated while at the licensed
establishment, sold liquor to already inebriated individuals, and allowed peo-
ple to perform "sexually explicit, lewd and vulgar acts on the . . .
premises. ' '49 8
Wishnow had previously been criminally prosecuted for these same of-
fenses. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had reversed his conviction
for those violations on the ground that the statute prohibiting lewd or vulgar
activity was unconstitutionally vague.499 Wishnow argued that the court of
criminal appeals holding applied not only in criminal prosecutions, but also
in the context of administrative proceedings. According to Wishnow, the
commission's revocation of the license was invalid since the commission re-
lied on an unconstitutional statute. The court of appeals agreed with Wish-
now and accepted the holding of the court of criminal appeals that the
particular section of the statute prohibiting lewd or vulgar acts was unconsti-
tutionally vague.5°° The court noted that generally, as a civil court, it would
not interfere in the proceedings of an entity like the Texas Alcoholic Bever-
age Commission that performs a criminal law function.50 1 If the particular
criminal statute involved is constitutionally suspect, however, the civil court
may intercede to prevent "irreparable injury to vested property rights. '50 2
The court concluded that since the criminal court had found the statute
prohibiting vulgar acts unconstitutional, no support existed to uphold the
cancellation order of the commission even though the commission found vi-
495. Id. at 117.
496. Id.
497. 704 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
498. Id. at 426; see TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.61(b)(7), (13), (14) (Vernon 1978);
id. § 104.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987). Id. § 11.61(b)(7) allows cancellation of a license if
"based on the general welfare, health, peace, morals and safety of the people and on the public
sense of decency," the method of operation of the business indicates that the license should be
cancelled. Id. § 11.61(b)(13) allows the commission to cancel a license if "the permittee was
intoxicated on the licensed premises." Id. § 11.61(b)(14) permits cancellation of a license
when the licensee sells liquor to a person already intoxicated or fails to remove an intoxicated
person from the premises. Id. § 104.01 allows cancellation if the licensee or an employee en-
gages in or allows others to engage in "lewd, immoral, or offensive" acts on the premises such
as "lewd or vulgar entertainment."
499. Wishnow v. State, 671 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc).
500. 704 S.W.2d at 427.
501. Id.
502. Id. (citing Texas Liquor Control Board v. Canyon Creek Land Corp., 456 S.W.2d
891, 894 (Tex. 1970)). The dissent argued that a liquor license is not a property right, but
rather a privilege that does not require constitutional due process protection. Id. at 428 (Sears,
J., dissenting). A court, therefore, could not interfere with the day-to-day operations of the
entity regulating that privilege. Id. at 428-29.
1987]
666 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
olations of other valid sections of the statute.50 3
503. Id. at 428.
